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THE EFFECT OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH
INSURANCE ON MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE
By J. Mark Ramseyer1
ABSTRACT
Japanese patients file relatively few medical malpractice claims. Most scholars try
to explain this phenomenon by identifying ‘‘faults’’ in the Japanese judicial system.
Largely, the faults they identify do not exist. Instead, a substantial part of the rea-
son for the malpractice claiming patterns may lie in the national health insurance
system. In order to contain the cost of this system, the government suppresses
the price it pays for the technologically most sophisticated procedures. Predict-
ably as a result, Japanese doctors have focused instead on more rudimentary
care. Yet, for reasons common to many societies, Japanese patients are less apt
to sue over rudimentary care. They are more likely to sue over sophisticated
care. In part, Japanese patients may bring relatively fewmalpractice suits because
the government has (for reasons of cost) suppressed the volume of the services
(namely, highly sophisticated services) that would otherwise generate the most
malpractice claims. I explore this issue with a dataset covering all malpractice
suits that generated a published district court opinion from 1995 to 2004.
1Potentially, universal health insurance programs do not just alter the
supply and distribution of medical services; potentially, they also shape
claiming and litigating behavior in malpractice disputes. After all, the
programs reduce the direct cost of medical services to patients. The
lower costs boost demand, and—to prevent the drain on the public
fisc—the government could (and usually does) respond by suppressing
the amounts it pays suppliers.
1 Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard University. I benefited from the
extensive and thoughtful suggestions of Jennifer Arlen, Albert Choi, Richard Epstein, Eric
Feldman, Tom Ginsburg, Mark Grady, John Haley, Robert Leflar, Salil Mehra, William
Sage, Masatatsu Sato, Steven Shavell, Frank Upham, the participants at and an anonymous
referee for the 2009 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, and participants in workshops
at Eastern Mennonite University, Harvard University, and the University of Tokyo. I received
generous financial assistance from Harvard Law School, the University of Tokyo, and the
Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law
School.
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2 By cutting the price it pays suppliers, a universal insurance program
alters both the quality and the mix of medical services sold. Facing state-
mandated prices below market-clearing levels, suppliers will cut the quality
of the services they provide. But because the program also changes the
relative prices of the various medical services, suppliers will shift the mix
of services they sell as well. They will offer relatively more of those services
commanding the higher mandated prices. They will offer less of those
commanding the lower prices.
3 For malpractice claiming patterns, these changes create potentially
cross-cutting effects. On the one hand, all else held equal, as the suppressed
prices induce sellers to degrade quality, malpractice claims should rise. On
the other hand, as sellers change the mix of services they offer in response
to the new price structure, they might—plausibly—shift the mix away
from those services that generate the most malpractice claims.
4 Consider the logic (explained in more detail below). To suppress the
potentially exploding costs of its insurance program, suppose a legislature
cuts the relative price it pays for the more sophisticated (and expensive)
services. Technologically intensive, physically invasive, implemented by a
team of medical specialists, and targeted toward high-risk patients, these
services often cause more observably adverse events than ordinary primary
care. They also generate the most legally cognizable negligence claims. Nec-
essarily, services that generate the most provable negligence and observable
‘‘bad outcomes’’ will generate the most malpractice claims. If the national
insurance leads sellers to provide fewer such services, fewer malpractice
claims will follow. In this article I explore this dynamic with aggregate
data on Japanese malpractice suits and insurance premia, and micro-
level data on all Japanese published medical malpractice opinions from
1995 to 2004.
5 Since the late-1950s, the Japanese government has offered universal
health insurance. The program heavily subsidizes the cost of medical ser-
vices, but does so at rates that poorly compensate the most modern and
sophisticated procedures. As a result, Japanese physicians offer large quan-
tities of rudimentary medical services. They offer far less of the sophisti-
cated procedures at the heart of modern medicine. In turn, this dynamic
may have led to fewer malpractice claims (I take no position on whether
the scarcity of claims is ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’). Patients anywhere seldom sue
unless they experience an observable ‘‘bad outcome.’’ But observably bad
outcomes do not as often occur in the rudimentary medicine so common
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in Japan: where physicians work in small settings, do relatively little, and
mostly see fundamentally healthy patients. They occur when physicians
undertake complicated procedures among a team of medical specialists
in large hospitals to save high-risk patients. Because of the skewed reim-
bursement rates, Japanese doctors perform plenty of the simple proce-
dures and prescribe large quantities of ordinary antibiotics. They offer
less of the technologically intensive, complicated, invasive procedures.
In part because the latter—not the former—generate the malpractice
disputes, Japanese patients bring fewer malpractice claims.2
6I begin by reviewing some basic comparative statistics on medical mal-
practice and the secondary literature on malpractice litigation in Japan
(Section 1). I offer a brief description of the Japanese health care industry
(Section 2). I describe my data and variables, and investigate potential
biases (Section 3). Using the data, I then explore the impact of the Japanese
national health insurance program on malpractice claims: whom do
patients sue and how much do they collect (Section 4), how much claiming
occurs (both in- and out-of-court; Section 5), and why are claiming levels
as low as they are (Section 6)? Given the very real biases in the dataset, Sec-
tion 3 is long. Impatient readers may wish to skim ahead to Section 4, and
return to 3 as necessary.
1. THE LITERATURE
1.1. The United States—the Short Story
7We know surprisingly little about medical malpractice disputes in Japan,
but we know a good bit about them in the United States. Given the massive
amounts of wealth transferred, scholars devote considerable attention to
the disputes. Although this is not a study of American malpractice, at
least implicitly most readers will compare Japan to what they think they
know of the United States. Consider, then, some simple statistics.
8In the United States (with its population of 307 million; the Japanese
population is 128 million), patients or their heirs file 50,000–160,000 mal-
practice claims each year. In a careful study, Mello & Studdert (2006: 13)
2 Granted, simple procedures generate medical malpractice claims too. Even a simple knee
operation, after all, can generate a claim if the doctor operates on the wrong knee. And
patients do sue non-specialist clinic doctors in Japan. The point here is simply that the
more sophisticated and complex procedures are more likely to generate claims—a point con-
sistent with the data from Japan detailed below.
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propose the low end of the range: 50,000 to 60,000 brought-claims annu-
ally, for a total transfer of $5.8 billion. The AON insurance brokerage
firm proposes the high end: 156,000 paid-claims, for a total $28.7 billion
(AON, 2004).3
9 Within the United States, disputing patterns vary widely by region.
Comparisons across studies are difficult, of course, as scholars use widely
divergent data sources and employ different definitions. Consider, how-
ever, some very simple statistics. From 1990 to 1997, claimants in Florida
(with its 14 million population) filed about 2,600 claims (Vidmar, et al.,
2005: 333), and collected on 50–60 percent of them. Those in Texas
(population 24 million) in 2002 filed 6,929 claims and collected on 5,555
(Black, et al., 2005: 246 tab. 13). At trial, U.S. malpractice claimants prevail
perhaps 20–30 percent of the time (Mello & Studdert, 2006: 13; Sloan &
Chepke, 2008: 165; Bovbjerg & Bartow, 2003: 32).4
10 When successful, U.S. patients (or heirs) collect $150,000 to $310,000
each. AON suggests that the average successful claimant collects $178,000
(AON, 2004). In Florida, the median successful claimant in 2003 collected
$150,000 and the mean claimant $300,000 (Vidmar, et al., 2005: 338 tab.
6). An insurer trade association reported median 2001 payouts of about
$180,000, and mean payouts of $310,000 (Bovbjerg & Bartow, 2003: 27).
Mello & Studdert (2006: 13) estimate the range for 2003 at $260,000 to
$310,000.
11 In wrongful death claims (25–35 percent of the claims; Vidmar, 2005:
340), heirs collect $200,000 to $300,000. In Florida, they received median
payments of $195,000 and mean payments of $290,000 (1990–2003;
Vidmar, et al., 2005: 340 tab. 7). According to the National Practitioner
3 Federal law apparently requires malpractice payments to be reported to the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank. According to the NPDB, however, only 17,000 claims were paid in 2005 in
the United States. NPDB 2005.
Robert Leflar estimates the number of claims made (not claims paid) in the United States at
70,000 per year (private correspondence).
4 As Mello & Studdert (2006: 13) recently put it:
A reasonable estimate [of the number of malpractice claims brought each year] is
probably in the 50,000 to 60,000 range. Available figures suggest that approximately
70 percent of malpractice claims do not reach trial. Those that do are heard by a
jury. Plaintiffs prevail in approximately 30 percent of trials. Considering settle-
ments and verdicts together, about 30 percent of all claims are closed with a payment
to the plaintiff.
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Data Bank (operated by the Department of Health & Human Services), in
2005 they collected median payments of $175,000 (NPDB 2005).
12To protect themselves against these malpractice claims, physicians buy
insurance coverage. Premiums vary with the insurance underwriting
cycle, location, and specialty. As of 2000, the mean American physician
paid a premium of about $18,500 (Bovbjerg & Bartow, 2003: 13). In
some states doctors pay more—the mean physician in West Virginia
paid $39,050. And in some specialties they pay more—in orthopedic sur-
gery (not the field with the highest premiums), in 2002 the mean doctor
paid $38,200 in the United States as a whole. The mean orthopedic surgeon
in Pennsylvania paid $73,300 (Bovbjerg & Bartow, 2003, 15).
13Nonstandardized and complex, malpractice claims take time to unravel.
From the time of the accident to its eventual resolution (litigated and set-
tled claims grouped together), claimants in Florida spent about 3.3 years
(Vidmar, et al., 2005: 330–331 tabs. 1, 2). In the United States more
broadly, according to the National Practitioner Data Bank, they spent a
median 4.13 years and a mean 4.66 years (NPDB 2005).
14Despite these large numbers of claims, studies of the U.S. malpractice
environment find that patients miss much of malpractice (Weiler et al.,
1993; Mello & Studdert, 2006: 16). They filed many claims, but they suffered
many more incidents of bad medical practice. They may sue some doctors
who did nothing wrong—though most who do apparently lose (Studdert,
et al., 2006). But they also miss many eminently negligent practitioners.
1.2. Japan—the Official Court Data
15The administrative office of the Japanese courts does not disclose much
about medical malpractice litigation, but it does specify its basic contours:
plaintiffs file few claims in court; of the claims they do file, they drop or
settle most; if they litigate to a final judgment, they spend about three
years in court; and at that final disposition, they win about 30–40 percent
of the time.
16In 2004, Japanese plaintiffs filed about 1,100 medical malpractice cases.
In the same year, the district courts closed about 1,000 (Table 1 Panel A).
Low as these numbers are, they did not represent a decline. Instead, they
were nearly twice as large as they had been in 1998. Additional summary
statistics appear in Table 2.
17The parties litigated about 40 percent of these 1000þ suits to a final
(lower-court) judgment. Plaintiffs filed 632 suits in 1998, and the courts
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Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics (I)
A. Numbers of Decisions
All Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cases
Filed
Cases
Closed
Court
Decisions
Published
Opinions
1995 42
1996 44
1997 33
1998 632 582 232 38
1999 678 569 230 23
2000 795 691 305 48
2001 824 722 334 44
2002 906 869 386 30
2003 1003 1035 406 30
2004 1110 1004 405 16
Notes: Columns (1) through (3) are from the administrative office of the courts; Column (4) is from
the published opinion database, as described in the text. Column (3) are hanketsu judgments.
B. Filing-to-Judgment Times and Recovery Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Cases Published Opinions
Filing to
Judgment
Plaintiff
Recovers
Filing to
Judgment
Plaintiff
Recovers
1995 5.00 yr. 66.7%
1996 3.80 65.9
1997 4.37 60.6
1998 2.93 yr. 43.5% 4.86 71.1
1999 2.88 30.4 5.00 73.9
2000 2.97 46.9 4.24 72.9
2001 2.72 38.3 3.68 75.0
2002 2.58 38.6 3.55 86.7
2003 2.31 44.3 3.82 96.7
2004 2.28 39.5 3.55 93.8
Notes: Column (2) includes only cases proceeding to judgment (hanketsu); Column (1) includes
cases that settle. Columns (1) and (2) are from the administrative office of the courts; Columns
(3) and (4) are from the published opinion database, as described in the text.
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adjudicated 232 (Table 1 Panel A). They filed 1,110 in 2004, and the courts
adjudicated 405 (40 percent). In the rest of the cases, either the plaintiffs
dropped their claims or the defendants paid out-of-court. These settlement
rates track those for civil litigation more generally: the courts closed
149,000 ordinary litigation cases in 2004, but adjudicated only 71,000 of
them (48 percent) (Shiho tokei, 2004: tab. 20).
18Malpractice claims take longer to adjudicate than the typical civil suit. In
1998, from filing to judgment the courts in malpractice suits took 35
months.5 By 2004, they had cut that number to 27 months (Table 1
Panel B). Most civil suits take far less time: of the 71,000 suits adjudicated
in 2004, the courts closed 76 percent within one year. They closed 97 per-
cent within three (Shiho tokei, 2004: tab. 20).
19Plaintiffs recover damages in about 30–45 percent of the medical mal-
practice cases they litigate to a final judgment (Table 1 Panel B).6 This
is lower than the comparable figure for civil litigation more generally.
Of the 71,000 ordinary civil suits adjudicated in 2004, plaintiffs won (in
whole or in part) 84.1 percent. Of the 44,000 suits in which they demanded
Table 1. (Continued)
C. Principal Litigation Venues
(1) (2) (3)
Pub’d Med Mal Ord. Civil Litigation All Med Mal.
Tokyo 30.5% 20.5 40.6%
Osaka 16.4 9.4 26.5
Nagoya 4.9 4.3 5.5
Yokohama 4.9 3.5 –
Fukuoka 4.3 9.5 8.1
Kobe 3.4 3.0 4.2
Other 35.6 49.7 20.1
Notes: Column (1) is from the published opinion database; Column (2) is from the administra-
tive office of the courts; Column (3) is from Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001).
Sources: Published opinion data base, as discussed in the text; Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo
(2001); Inoue (2007); Saiko saibansho jimusokyoku (2004).
5 Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001: 58) find the mean filing-to-judgment times of 3.0
years for 1989–1998.
6 Hagihara, Nishi, & Nobutomo (2003: 121) find plaintiff recovery rates of 31.8 percent in
1986–1998 malpractice cases.
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Table 2. Selected Summary Statistics (II)
A. Principal Malpractice Claims, by Procedure
Pub op All cases
Surgery-related 46.3% 38.9
Obstetrics 15.5 13.7
Cancer 16.7
Medication-related 15.2
Misdiagnosis 12.4
Cerebrovascular 10.3
Emergency facilities 9.8
Cardiovascular 7.5
Notes: Published opinion dataset, as described in text; n¼ 348.Categories are notmutually exclusive.
B. Malpractice Claims and Beds, by Institution
Malpractice
Claims Beds
Government hospital 20.7% 21.4%
University hospital 17.5 5.7%
Other public hospital 17.1 17.8%
Private hospital 22.7 55.2%*
Private clinic 18.7
Dental clinic 1.5
Notes: Claims data from published opinion dataset, as described in text; n¼ 343.
*: Includes both private hospitals and private clinics.
C. Malpractice Claims, by Patient Age
Age % Civil Cases
0–2 16.1%
3–10 4.0
11–20 6.6
21–30 12.6
31–40 7.8
41–50 10.6
51–60 16.1
61–70 10.9
71– 15.2
Notes: Published opinion dataset, as described in text, n¼ 348.
Sources: Published opinion data base, as described in the text; www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/
about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_01.html (through _04.html); Kosei rodo sho (2005).
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a money judgment, they recovered some amount in 80.9 percent (Shiho
tokei, 2004: tab. 19).
1.3. Japan—the Scholarship
20Why Japanese patients claim and litigate as they do raises a variety of
issues, some general to civil litigation more broadly, and some specific
to medical malpractice.7 In a careful and perceptive series of studies,
legal scholar Robert B. Leflar (2009a: 444–445) focuses on the institutional
structure of the courts and the legal services industry. The small number of
lawyers (about 24,000), he notes, raises the cost of malpractice litigation.
The ‘‘delay in case resolution (at least before recent reforms)’’ reduced
its return. The predictability of the damage awards facilitates out-of-
court settlement (see also Leflar & Iwata, 2005). And the tendency of
Japanese attorneys to demand a non-contingent retainer up-front requires
many would-be plaintiffs to front cash they do not have.
21By contrast, Hideo Yasunaga (2008: 39–40) of the University of Tokyo
Medical Faculty champions cultural explanations. ‘‘Japanese people have a
tendency to avoid antagonist situations or confrontation,’’ he writes, and
prefer ‘‘out-of-court settlements for dispute resolutions.’’ Like Leflar, he
does note that attorneys are few and delays chronic. But unlike Leflar
he characterizes the resulting situation in conspiratorial terms: until the
1990s, the ‘‘insidious violations of human rights’’ in medical practice
were ‘‘hushed up and concealed.’’
22Legal scholar Eric Feldman (2009: 257–258) sees malpractice litigation
as a phenomenon that reflects both ‘‘Japanese culture’’ and structural
barriers that ‘‘inhibit access to the legal system.’’ According to Feldman
(2009: 259), ‘‘the government’s long-standing approach to tort-related
claims. effectively shut the door to tort litigation.’’ Feldman attributes
the low litigation and claiming rates in part to the non-contingent retainer
arrangements (264) and the long delays: ‘‘in 2006 it still took an average of
25.1 months for the average malpractice case to move from filing to final
judgment in the district courts’’ (269).
7 Ramseyer & Nakazato (1999: 70–74) suggested that claims were low because there was little
quality dispersion in Japanese medicine, and the courts set the standard of care low enough
that few doctors failed to meet it. As the discussion below shows, however, there is indeed
quality dispersion in Japanese medicine—and plaintiffs disproportionately target the doctors
offering the highest quality care.
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23 Feldman adds two additional structural factors. First, Japanese courts
require plaintiffs to ‘‘prove the central elements of their allegations’’
(2009: 263–264). ‘‘[B]y requiring plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof
in medical malpractice cases,’’ he explains, ‘‘Japanese courts effectively
limit the number of malpractice claims that can succeed.’’ Second, court
awards are not just predictable, but ‘‘modest’’ besides (265). More specif-
ically, ‘‘[d]amages in medical malpractice cases in Japan are.more pre-
dictable and more modest than in the United States’’ (266). By contrast,
Leflar & Iwata (2005) observe that ‘‘mean and median awards in U.S.
wrongful death cases. seem not to diverge radically from the Japanese
scale of things.’’
24 Scholars have discussed several other aspects of the Japanese malpractice
disputing environment. Leflar (2009a) and Leflar & Iwata (2005: 201), for
example, suggest that malpractice insurance premiums in Japan ‘‘could be
considered a very rough-hewn proxy for liability payouts in the long term.’’
They then observe (2009: 8 n.28) that physician members of the Japan
Medical Association (JMA) obtain their coverage for 70,000 yen (about
$700), and general hospitals for about 30,000 yen (about $300) per bed.8
Other discussions of the malpractice insurance industry include Nakajima,
et al. (2001), Kinoshita (2007), Yamashita (2008), and Miyasaka (2002).
25 Prosecutors in Japan bring criminal charges against physicians for the
most egregious cases of malpractice. Leflar (2009b) and Leflar & Iwata
(2005) carefully explore the possibility that criminal sanctions might fill
a gap in incentives left by the scarcity of private litigation. They note
that prosecutors bring few claims, but observe that they obtain broad
news coverage for the few they do file. Criminal prosecutions for malprac-
tice are also discussed in Sawa (2008).
26 Two papers examine unpublished as well as published decisions in
malpractice cases. Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001) study 310 mal-
practice cases from 1989–1998 in the major district courts (importantly,
including Tokyo and Osaka). Like Leflar, Yasunaga, and Feldman, they attri-
bute the low litigation rate to the delays and attorney fee structure. Hagihara,
Nishi, & Nobutomo (2003) examine 435 cases from 1986–1998 in the major
8 A similar suggestion appears in Ramseyer & Nakazato (1999: 69–70). Foreign exchange rates
obviously represent a moving target. Over the past decade, however, $1.00 has tended to trade
for about 100 yen. The dataset below runs from 1995 to 2004. In January 1995, $1.00 went for
101 yen. In December 2004, it equalled 103 yen.
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district courts (apparently a database that overlaps with that of Maeda,
Sakamoto, & Nobutomo). They find that 47 percent of the cases involved
wrongful-death claims, that 32 percent resulted in a plaintiff recovery, and
that the successful claimants in the wrongful-death cases collected a mean
of 28 million yen.
27Other studies focus more narrowly on specific medical procedures or
issues. Hiyama, et al. (2006), examine malpractice claims over endoscop-
ies, for instance, while Shimada & Kato (1994) survey anesthesia-related
claims. Hamasaki, Takehara, & Hagihara (2008) and Aoki, et al. (2008)
both study doctor-patient communications in malpractice disputes.
1.4. Other Comparisons
28Perhaps because malpractice in most societies outside the United States
involves small aggregate transfers, we know less about the claiming pro-
cesses in other countries. In most advanced democracies, patients file far
fewer claims than in the United States. But—importantly given the focus
of this paper—in most of these countries the government has also for
years more closely controlled the medical services industry.
29The United Kingdom and Canada couple a universal health care pro-
gram with legal systems otherwise similar to that in the United States.
Both have little malpractice litigation. In the United Kingdom, the
National Health Service estimates its annual expenditures for malpractice
at $642 million (fiscal 2001–2002, on a population of 59 million; Wheat,
2005). In Canada, on a population of 32 million, plaintiffs filed 1,083 mal-
practice suits in 2004 (CHSRF, 2006). Trebilcock, Dewees, & Duff (1990:
542) estimate that ‘‘the average frequency of claims filed against physicians
in the U.S. is about five times greater than in Canada.’’
30In several other advanced democracies, the government has displaced
the tort regime from malpractice entirely. In New Zealand, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Finland, for instance, it has imposed no-fault instead (OECD,
2006: 13–14).
2. THE JAPANESE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
2.1. Universal Health Insurance
31The Japanese government offers universal health insurance, and does so at
low cost. Although it purports to cover nearly all citizens for nearly all care,
the program costs barely 8 percent of GDP. By contrast, the United States
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spends 15 percent or more of its GDP on health care, and even France and
Germany spend 10 and 11 percent (Nihon Iryo, 2007).
32 The Japanese universal insurance program dates from the late 1950s
(Ramseyer, 2009). Facing electoral challenges from a socialist and commu-
nist left, the conservative ruling party folded existing health insurance
programs into a national insurance plan. Formally, the ‘‘plan’’ was not
one but several. It allocated residents to different programs by their age
and employment status. Employees in large firms it registered in one set
of plans, for example, and those in small firms in another. The employees
of the large firms it insured with private insurers, the self-employed with
municipal governments (Kameoka, 2005: 8–13).
33 Through these plans, the Japanese government claims to cover all resi-
dents against the cost of most major medical problems. According to polit-
ical scientist John Campbell and health care specialist Naoki Ikegami
(1998: 1–2), ‘‘[v]irtually the entire population is included in mandatory
health insurance.’’ Through the insurance, the government ‘‘covers nearly
all regular health care.’’
2.2. Service Providers
34 The 270,000 physicians (2.0 per 1000 population compared to 2.3 in the
United States) who provide the services under the Japanese universal plan
fall broadly into two groups: (a) the men and women who run the small,
often low-quality clinics, and (b) the doctors who staff the larger hospitals
and sometimes offer very high quality care. About a third of all Japanese phy-
sicians work in the private clinics. Defined as institutions with fewer than 20
beds, these are small private affairs. The senior doctor either owns the clinic
directly or (effectively) owns it through a non-profit organization he controls.
35 Of all practicing doctors in Japan, 93,000 work in one of these small clin-
ics (Kosei rodo sho, 2006: tab. 2–46). Seventy-one thousand own their own
clinic, and another 22,000 work for someone else. Having invested heavily
in their clinics, eventually they often transfer them to their sons or daugh-
ters.9 Depending on the clinic’s size, the physician may also hire one or two
nurses, and a receptionist. Sometimes, he will employ a pharmacist on staff
9 Given the difficulty their children sometimes have in gaining admission to medical schools,
several private schools function—effectively—as schools of last resort for the not-very-bright
offspring of very wealthy clinic owners. Teikyo University in Tokyo, for example, demands
tuition and fees of 14.2 million yen in the first year. Over the six years of medical school edu-
cation, it collects tuition and fees of about 49.2 million.
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and sell the drugs he prescribes. He will not have admitting privileges at a
larger hospital.
36Most of the remaining physicians work as salaried employees at the
larger hospitals (Kosei rodo sho, 2006: tab. 2–46). The most sophisticated
work at the hospitals associated with elite medical schools. Others practice
at the larger hospitals run by national, prefectural, or municipal govern-
ments. Still others work at the hospitals operated by charitable organiza-
tions like the Red Cross.
2.3. The Political Economy
37The government sets its prices through negotiations with the physician
trade association. Every other year, representatives of the Ministry of
Health, Labor & Welfare (MHLW) negotiate a fee schedule with the
JMA (Campbell & Ikegami, 1998: ch. 6). The JMA, in turn, advances the
interests of the clinic doctors. It may include only 61 percent of all Japanese
doctors, but it includes virtually everyone who runs a clinic.10
38By all accounts, the government sets prices low, but low in a way that
favors the clinic doctors over their hospital competitors. According to
Campbell & Ikegami (1998: 147), it sets the prices at about one quarter
of the level the service would cost in the United States. Crucially, it also
skews the prices in ways that divert revenue away from doctors who invest
in specialized expertise. It diverts revenue toward those who invest in the
small clinics.11
39As Campbell & Ikegami (1998: 84, 173–174) explain it, the government
‘‘makes inexpensive primary care relatively profitable and expensive high-
tech procedures unprofitable.’’ This ‘‘[c]ontinued domination by the
JMA’’ of health policy, they (1998: 174) write,
10 Data on total physicians from Kosei rodo sho (2006) for 2004; data on JMA membership from
its webside, www.med.or.jp for 2006. See Ramseyer (2009b).
The political economy of the domination of the JMA by the owner-physicians rather than
the staff-physicians is reasonably straightforward. First, the owner-doctors own a larger cap-
ital investment, and its value hinges on government policy and regulation. Second, because
many of the staff-doctors plan eventually to build their own clinic or hospital, they stand
at a transitional stage in their career. Notwithstanding this domination by owner-physicians,
the JMA continues to work to bring staff-doctors within its ambit. See, e.g., Fukuda (2007:
188); Takeda (2008).
11 To be sure, relative prices are something of a moving target—and the clinic physicians may
steadily be losing influence on policy. The basic pricing advantage to simple, low-tech proce-
dures, however, remains.
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[has] left hospital services, especially high-tech medicine and nursing, poorly
reimbursed, with no provision for capital investment or administrative over-
head. [O]ffice-based physicians and the government have become de facto
allies in maintaining the status quo by preventing the encroachment of hos-
pitals and the expensive high-tech medicine that they promote.
40 Long the single largest donor to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party,12
the JMA uses its power in ways that extend beyond the price schedule.
Through the regulatory structure, it maintains a variety of anti-competitive
restraints:13 caps on new beds in a locality, advertising restrictions, higher
fees for patients who try to consult with a sophisticated hospital without
first visiting a small clinic,14 and bans on corporate hospital ownership.
41 Informally, the government often capitulates to local physician opposi-
tion to the construction of larger and more sophisticated hospitals.15 Amer-
ican physicians lobby for municipal hospitals because they need places to
admit their patients. JMA physicians face no such incentive. Instead, they
earn the most if they keep their patients out of the hospital and in their
own clinic. To them, a community hospital is simply a more sophisticated
competitor for their most lucrative customers. Often, they fight plans to
build new municipal hospitals in their cities. Often, the government defers.
2.4. Consequences
2.4.1. Not preventive care
42 Perhaps the health-care debate in the United States leads readers to think
that the skewed pricing structure in Japan might improve primary care.
Perhaps it leads them to think that the shift away from technology toward
office visits might promote ‘‘preventive’’ medicine.
12 The domination of medical policy by the JMA is famous. See, e.g., Campbell & Ikegami (1998:
32); see also Ouchi (2005: 129).
13 See Kokuritsu shakai (2006: 428 tab. 229) (bed caps), Iryo ho [Medical Services Act], Law No.
205 of 1948, Sec. 6–5 (advertising restrictions), Yashiro, Suzuki, & Suzuki (2006: 28) (sur-
charge on hospital visits), Iryo ho, supra, at Sec. 7(3) (corporate ban).
14 A rule that could—paradoxically—aggravate misdiagnosis claims, since it funnels patients to
the least sophisticated practitioners for triage.
15 For examples of the way that local medical associations fight the construction of new hospi-
tals, see the controversy in the Musashimurayama area, detailed at http://www1.neweb.ne.jp/
wb/misikai/sub8.html, and the controversy in Kannondera city, detailed at http://www
.shikoku-np.co.jp/feature/tuiseki/003/index.htm. The JMA also worked to promote regional
limits on hospital beds, as described earlier in the text. See Campbell & Ikegami (1998: 67).
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43At least in Japan, the skewed pricing does neither of these. Because the
government sets even primary care prices below market-clearing levels,
doctors relentlessly depreciate quality (Ramseyer, 2009a, 2009b). The
insurance program pays them per visit, so they keep visits short and see
as many patients per day as possible.16 It pays them for medication, so
they prescribe and sell large amounts of drugs. It reimburses in-patient
care at high levels, so they keep patients far longer than in the United States
or western Europe.17
44The insurance does not promote preventive care for a simple reason: it
does not cover it. The insurance covers only treatments for accidents and
disease, and preventive care falls under neither. Many middle-class Japa-
nese do obtain excellent preventive care, but they pay for it in cash. For
the popular batteries of periodic tests called ‘‘human docks,’’ they pay
40,000 to 100,000 yen.18
2.4.2. Not health
45Then again, perhaps readers attribute Japanese life expectancies to medical
care. Japanese do live long. At birth, white American males can expect to
live 75 years (females, 80). Japanese males can expect to live 79 years (fe-
males, 86). Even at age 40, Japanese men have a life expectancy of another
40 years (women, 46) while white American men have only 38 years
(women, 42).
46Life expectancy depends on many factors, however, of which sophisti-
cated medical care is but one. Of those factors, it is not even the most
important. Clean water, sanitation, and treatments for infectious dis-
eases all matter too (Cutler & Miller, 2004; Cutler, Deaton, & Lleras-
Muney, 2006), and on these factors the United States and Japan do not
16 The popular Japanese adage is ‘‘to wait 3 hours for a 3 minute consult.’’ Discussed more fully
at Ramseyer (2009a).
17 The mean in-patient stay in Japan is 36.3 days. The comparable figures for the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, and France are 6.5, 7.2, 10.4, and 13.4 days. See Ramseyer
(2009a).
18 The phrase refers to the process of hooking the patient up to a series of diagnostic machines,
much like a ship docked at a harbor. The session provides a long battery of tests for diseases
that hit the middle-aged. The tests are not covered by the national insurance. For shorter
versions that take one day, the fees run 40,000–60,000 yen; the two-day sessions run
50,000–100,000 yen. See http://www.medicapark.com/knowledge/dock_bean03.html. Some
insurance programs may cover these tests.
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markedly differ. Smoking matters as well, and Japanese smoke more than
Americans do.
47 But food and exercise also matter. Japanese eat less saturated fat, and
eat less generally. Given urban geography, they walk much farther. As a
result, they stand considerably trimmer than most Americans. Among
Americans, 34.1 percent are overweight (BMI of 25–30) and 32.2 percent
are obese (BMI over 30). Among Japanese, only 20.3 percent are over-
weight and barely 3.1 percent obese (WHO, 2008). Excess weight takes
a large toll. By age 40, an overweight man can expect to live 3 fewer
years; an obese man can expect 7 fewer (Peeters, et al., 2003). As Coma-
nor, Frech, & Miller (2006: 22; see also Frech, 2008) put it, ‘‘the relatively
poor health outcomes reported for the United States result from a partic-
ular risk factor prominent in the U.S.: high obesity rates.’’ The longer life-
span in Japan than in the United States does not reflect better medical
care. In part, it merely reflects the choices people make about calories-
in and calories-out.
2.4.3. Not specialized expertise
48 The universal health insurance does ensure that doctors not specialize.
Effectively, it eliminates any financial incentive for them to do so. Because
the universal coverage boosts demand while the licensing regime cuts sup-
ply, Japanese physicians can fill their days at government rates. They will
fill their days at government rates if they spend years acquiring specialty
and subspecialty skills, and they will also fill their days at government
rates if they invest in no specialty training at all.
49 Predictably, most Japanese doctors choose not to acquire specialized
expertise. They do what they must for their basic license, but no more.
Of the 19,000 JMA members in Tokyo (56 percent of all Tokyo doctors),
barely 1,100 advertise themselves as board-certified. Earning no returns to
specialization, those at the clinics treat (virtually) any ailment a patient
might bring. Typically, they advertise services in multiple fields. Often,
they advertise services in completely unrelated fields like internal medicine
and surgery (Ramseyer, 2009a).
2.4.4. Not sophisticated procedures
50 As noted earlier, moreover, the Japanese insurance program also cuts
the number of doctors and hospitals that offer the more sophisti-
cated and complex procedures: bypass operations and angioplasty for
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heart disease, for example, carotid angioplasty and endarterectomy
to prevent strokes, or the complex operations and chemotherapies for
cancer. Potentially, these technologically intensive procedures can
save lives. Although a few early studies suggested that some brought
only modest returns (McClellan, McNeil & Newhouse, 1994), more
recent work indicates that—when used appropriately—they can gener-
ate large benefits.19
51Japanese doctors perform these complex procedures far less often than
their U.S. peers. In 2005, for instance, American doctors performed
469,000 cardiac bypass (coronary artery bypass graft; CABG) operations
and 1.27 million angioplasties. Although Japan had about a quarter the
number of deaths from heart disease, Japanese doctors performed less
than 3 percent of the U.S. bypass operations (12,000), and less than 6 per-
cent of the angioplasties (70,000–100,000).20
52The Japanese government cuts its cancer treatment costs by refusing to
license the new chemotherapy drugs.21 Pharmaceutical research is expen-
sive. Even as the industry develops ever more effective chemotherapy
regimes, it has paid for the research with ever higher prices. When proven
effective, the U.S. government has approved these drugs for use. Nominally
out of safety concerns, however, the Japanese government has refused to
approve many of them for its insurance coverage.
53Denied access to the most effective treatment regimes, more and
more Japanese cancer patients simply abandon the universal insurance.
They cannot formally abandon it, of course. But rather than make
do with its limited chemotherapy options, they turn to a growing
group of oncologists who offer the new (U.S.-licensed) treatments on
a cash basis.
54In part to help Japanese plan for their possible off-universal-insurance
chemotherapy needs, an increasing number of insurers offer specifically
19 The literature is massive, but a few of the studies include, Cutler (2007); Hemingway, et al.
(2001, 2008); Faxon (2008); Normand, et al. (2001); Guadagnoli, et al. (2000). Obviously,
they do not always generate benefits. The procedures themselves carry risks, and when not
medically indicated the expected benefits do not outweigh those risks.
20 Japan figures: Sezai, Orime, & Tsukamoto (2007) and Yomiuri (2008) on number of bypass
operations; Yomiuri (2008) and Shukan Asahi (2008) on number of angioplasties. U.S. fig-
ures: American Heart Association (2008).
21 For a list of the licensed and unlicensed chemotherapy drugs, see www.cancerinfo.tri-kobe
.org.
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‘‘cancer insurance.’’ Aflac was said to dominate the market. In 2007, it
alone sold 639,000 new cancer insurance policies. At least eight other
firms offered the insurance as well.22
3. DATA
3.1. The Databases
55 To examine malpractice disputes in detail beyond that disclosed by the
administrative office of the courts, I examine all judicial decisions
published in the course of a decade. More specifically, I code every dis-
trict court opinion published from 1995 to 2004 that appears in a search
for ‘‘medical malpractice’’ in the Hanrei taikei database.23 This yields a
population of 351 opinions, 348 civil and 3 criminal. With this informa-
tion, I produce two datasets: a case-level database, and a prefecture-level
database.
3.2. The Variables
3.2.1. Case-level database
56 I code each opinion for the following variables. Summary statistics appear
in Table 3.
a. Financial.
Award Value: the total amount awarded to the plaintiff.
Demand Value: the total amount demanded by the plaintiff.
b. Delays.
File-to-Judgment: Number of years from the year of filing to the
judgment, provided filed within 3 years of accident.
Accident-to-Judgment: Number of years from the year of accident
to the judgment, provided filed within 3 years of accident.
22 Aflac sold 1.4 million new policies (of all types) in 2007. See 2007 Annual Report, Afurakku no
genjo, 2008 [The Present State of Aflac, 2008], at 6, available at www.aflac.co.jp. A web search
in mid-2008 disclosed at least 8 other firms offering cancer insurance: Mitsui-Sumitomo
Marine, Tokyo Marine, Sonpo Japan, Secom sonpo, AIG, AIU. American Home Direct,
and Zurich.
23 That is, under ‘‘jiko,’’ I search for ‘‘iryo kago.’’ Hanrei taikei is published by the Dai-ichi hoki
firm. Eighteen cases that appeared in the search were dropped as not involving malpractice.
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Table 3. Selected Summary Statistics (III)
n Min Mean Median Max
A. Case Level:
1. Financial.
Award Value (/1000) 346 0 31,100 14,500 205,000
Demand Value (/1000) 338 589 74,400 59,400 546,000
2. Delays.
File-to-Judgment 265 0 4.20 4 11
Accident-to-Judgment 265 1 5.82 5 14
3. Recovery.
Plaintiff Recovers 348 0 .744 1 1
No Causation 343 0 .201 0 1
4. Patient.
Male 341 0 .543 1 1
Death 348 0 .592 1 1
Age 316 0 36.3 38.5 88
5. Accident.
Misdiagnosis 348 0 .124 0 1
Medication Error 348 0 .152 0 1
Surgery 348 0 .463 0 1
Obstetrics 348 0 .155 0 1
Emergency Room 348 0 .098 0 1
Cardiac Care 348 0 .075 0 1
Cerebrovascular 348 0 .103 0 1
Cancer 348 0 .167 0 1
6. Institution.
University Hospital 343 0 .175 0 1
Government Hospital 343 0 .207 0 1
Red Cross Hospital 343 0 .047 0 1
Other Public Hospital 343 0 .125 0 1
Private Hospital 343 0 .227 0 1
Dental Clinic 343 0 .015 0 1
Clinic 343 0 .187 0 1
(continued)
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c. Recovery.
Plaintiff Recovers: 1 if the plaintiff recovered at least some amount
in damages; 0 otherwise.
No Causation: 1 if the court found that the defendant did not fully
cause the accident, that the defendant did not fully cause the patient’s
damages, or that the patient was partially negligent as well; 0 otherwise.
d. Patient.
Male: 1 if the patient is male; 0 otherwise.
Death: 1 if the patient died from the accident; 0 otherwise.
Age: the age of the patient at the time of the accident.
e. Accident.
Misdiagnosis: 1 if the wrongful act involved a misdiagnosis; 0
otherwise.
Table 3. (Continued)
B. Prefecture Level:
1. Explanatory variables.
Suits 46 0 7.57 2.5 106
Population (/1000) 46 607 2,748 1,798 12,600
% Population over 64 46 16.4 22.5 21.9 27.1
% Agricultural Econ 46 .3 25.3 27.7 89.2
Density 46 67.4 649 268 5751
GDP PC (/million) 46 2.7 3.5 3.6 6.5
Hospital Beds 46 9,396 34,933 24,367 129,939
Clinic Beds 46 622 3,436 2,898 10,990
Medical School 46 1 1.72 1 13
Cardiac Bypass 46 0 3.74 2 20
Attorneys 46 28 456 91.5 10,263
2. Instruments.
Museums 46 3.3 11.2 9.85 32.9
Concerts 46 9.85 12.7 12.4 15.6
School Internet 46 37 70.4 71.6 92.1
College Grads 46 7.2 12.3 11.4 24.2
Notes: Case data are from published opinion database, as described in text.
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Medication Error: 1 if the wrongful act involved a medication
error; 0 otherwise.
Surgery: 1 if the wrongful act involved surgery; 0 otherwise.
Obstetrics: 1 if the wrongful act involved obstetrics; 0 otherwise.
Emergency Room: 1 if the wrongful act took place in an emergency
room; 0 otherwise.
Cardiac Care: 1 if the wrongful act involved cardiac care; 0 otherwise.
Cerebrovascular: 1 if the wrongful act involved cerebrovascular
disease; 0 otherwise.
Cancer: 1 if the wrongful act involved cancer; 0 otherwise.
f. Institution.
University Hospital: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a university
hospital; 0 otherwise.
Government Hospital: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a govern-
ment (but not university) hospital; 0 otherwise.
Red Cross Hospital: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a Red Cross
hospital; 0 otherwise.
Other Public Hospital: 1 if the wrongful act took place at any other
public hospital; 0 otherwise.
Private Hospital: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a private hos-
pital; 0 otherwise.
Dental Clinic: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a dental clinic; 0
otherwise.
Clinic: 1 if the wrongful act took place at a clinic; 0 otherwise.
g. Other.
Year suit filed, year of accident, and geographical dummies for the
most often used district courts.
3.2.2. Prefecture-level database
57At the prefecture-level, I calculate the following variables:
Suits: Number of malpractice suits filed in the prefecture, 1995–2004.
Population: Population, 2005.
% Population over 64: Percentage of population age 65 or older.
%Agricultural Econ: Value of agricultural output, divided by pre-
fectural GDP.
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Density: Population per square kilometer.
GDP PC: Prefectural GDP per capita, in billion yen.
Hospital Beds: Number of hospital beds (MHWL, 2008).
Clinic Beds: Number of clinic beds (MHWL, 2008).
Medical School: Number of medical schools.
Cardiac Bypass: Number of hospitals performing more than 100
heart surgeries (including cardiac by-pass operations but not cath-
eterization) in 2007 (Asahi shinbun shuppan, 2009).
Attorneys: Total number of attorneys, 2004 (Nihon bengoshi
rengo kai, 2005).
3.2.3. Instruments
58 As instruments for the number of attorneys per prefecture (see Section
6.1.2(b)), I add:
Museums: Total museums in prefecture (including zoos, aquari-
ums, etc.), 2002 (Toba, 2005).
Concerts: Percent of population (10 years old or older) who attend
music concerts (for reasons not explained, the source excludes clas-
sical concerts), 2001 (Toba, 2005).
School Internet: Percent of public schools with high-speed inter-
net access, 2003 (Toba, 2005).
College Grads: Percent of population who graduated from a uni-
versity, 2000 (Toba, 2005).
3.3. Biases
3.3.1. Introduction
59 Like Lexis and Westlaw, the Hanrei taikei purports to include all pub-
lished opinions. Some of these opinions appeared in one or more official
(often subject-specific) court reporters. The rest appeared in the private
reporters.
60 My database is biased. Whether a collection of all published malpractice
opinions might be biased is not the question: clearly, it is. Publication
introduces one obvious bias. The courts decide which opinions to publish
officially. Presumably they publish those opinions that they think provide
(among other things) proper precedential direction. By contrast (and not
to put too fine a spin on it), the publishers of the private reporters are in
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the business of selling magazines. They include those opinions that they
think will boost subscription rates.
61The very fact of litigation introduces a second bias. We have known at
least since Priest & Klein (1984) that litigated cases—whether published or
not—are not a random sample of all disputes. Instead, they represent those
disputes that the parties chose not to settle out-of-court. Given that the
vast majority of disputes settle, those that do not will potentially differ
along several important dimensions.
62Consider, then, some evidence about the direction and magnitude of the
biases involved.
3.3.2. The published malpractice opinions represent a larger fraction of the underlying
court cases than other published civil opinions
63From 1998 to 2004, the Japanese courts issued 2,298 civil judgments in
medical malpractice cases (summing Table 1 Panel A Column (3)). During
the same period, the various reporters published 229 (10.0 percent; sum-
ming Column (4)).24
64By contrast, in 2004 court reporters published only 1.9 percent
(1358) of all civil judgments. If I exclude default judgments, they pub-
lished 3.0 percent (from Hanrei taikei database; Shiho tokei, 2004: tab.
20). Apparently, reporters publish about five times as many malpractice
opinions as civil opinions more generally. A large fraction of the civil
suits represent legally mundane traffic accidents and debt-collection
disputes. As a relatively new field, medical malpractice opinions raise
more interesting issues, and the reporters publish a bigger fraction of
them.
3.3.3. The plaintiffs in the published malpractice cases win more often than malpractice
plaintiffs generally
65According to Panel B of Table 1, the fraction of cases that the published-
opinion plaintiffs won rose from 65–75 percent in 1995–2001 to over 90
percent by 2003. During the same period, plaintiffs in malpractice cases
as a whole. published and unpublished, won only 30 to 45 percent. Recall
from Section 1.1, above, that plaintiffs in U.S. malpractice cases win about
20–30 percent.
24 In 2002, Texas claimants filed 6,929 ‘‘claims’’ (Black, et al., 2005: 246 tab. 13). A simple Lexis
search for ‘‘medical malpractice’’ for Texas state courts in 2002 yields 109 opinions.
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66 Hypothetically, the high plaintiff win-rate in the published cases might
reflect a desire among judges to encourage malpractice claims. In fact,
it does not. The official reporters nearly boycotted the malpractice field.
During the ten years involved, they published only fifteen opinions in
civil malpractice opinions. Among them, the plaintiffs won only eight.
67 The high plaintiff win-rates instead track the editorial bias at the commer-
cial reporters. Perhaps the editors liked malpractice opinions, but thought
plaintiff losses bored their readers. Apparently, they decided that plaintiff
victories offered subscribers a ‘‘better read’’ than plaintiff losses. Among
the 337 cases in the private reporters, plaintiffs won 75.4 percent.
3.3.4. Wrongful-death claims constitute a slightly higher percentage of the published
malpractice cases than the unpublished
68 Among the published cases, 59.5 percent involved patients who died
(Table 4). For all malpractice cases, the administrative office does not
release the comparable fraction. Nonetheless, Hagihara, Nishi, & Nobu-
tomo (2003) study all malpractice decisions (435) in ten district courts
over 1986–1998. Examining both published and unpublished decisions,
they find that 47.0 percent involved deaths. Apparently, the published
opinions involve disproportionately many death claims.25
3.3.5. Plaintiffs disproportionately sue in Tokyo and Osaka, as the published-opinion
database reflects
69 The administrative office of the courts does not disclose where malpractice
plaintiffs bring their claims. In what seems the same procedure as Hagi-
hara, Nishi, & Nobutomo (2003), however, Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobu-
tomo (2001) survey all (published and unpublished) malpractice cases
from 1989–1998 for ten district courts (excluding Yokohama). They do
disclose the number of cases from each court, and I report the numbers
in Table 1 Panel C Column (3).
70 Disproportionately, malpractice claimants sue in Tokyo and Osaka.
According to the Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo database, they filed 41
percent of all malpractice cases in Tokyo and 27 percent in Osaka.
Among civil cases more generally, plaintiffs filed only 21 percent in
Tokyo and 9 percent in Osaka (Column (2)).
25 Alternatively, of course, the difference could reflect the differing time periods at stake.
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71If anything, published malpractice opinions disproportionately include
cases not from Tokyo or Osaka. Only 31 percent of the published cases
come from Tokyo and 16 percent from Osaka (Column (1)). Recall, how-
ever, that Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo only survey 10 district courts.
Tokyo and Osaka cases are a larger fraction of their universe—but their
universe includes fewer than all courts.
72For the most part, any geographical bias may not matter. Other than on
time-to-judgment (see Subsection 3.3.6, below), the courts seem not to
differ on any dimension measured here.26 Indeed, Hagihara, Nishi, &
Nobutomo (2003: 121) assert that ‘‘there are no reports on regional differ-
ences in medical malpractice decision-making’’ among the different courts.
Table 4. Amounts Recovered
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Payout
Percent
Death
Mean Payout
Pub. Death (Pub.) All.
1995 979* 69.0% 23.3* 38.9* 24.0*
1996 834 68.2 19.4 51.4 15.3
1997 564 72.7 17.1 36.5 15.4
1998 1,041 57.9 27.4 55.8 40.1
1999 957 69.6 41.6 61.9
2000 1,181 47.9 25.3 53.6
2001 1,408 52.3 32.0 63.0
2002 1,338 50.0 44.6 38.3
2003 1,485 46.7 49.5 49.7
2004 954 62.5 59.6 74.7
1995–2004 10,761 59.5 31.1 50.0
Notes: *Payout numbers are in million yen. Column (3) includes cases in which plaintiff did not
recover. Column (4) is limited to wrongful death cases in which the plaintiff recovers at least
some amount, and where the court does not reduce recovery for contributory negligence or
causation issues.
Columns (1)–(4) are from the published opinion dataset, as described in the text. Column (5)
is fromMaeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001), and gives the mean pay out in all cases filed in
court, including those that settle.
26 As explained below (Sec. 4.4.3.), however, Japanese courts do hold doctors to a standard of
care that varies in part by the local environment.
Fall 2010: Volume 2, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 645
 at Ernst M
ayr Library of the M
useum
 Com
p Zoology, H
arvard U
niversity on January 14, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
73 The published-opinion dataset seems largely to confirm the Hagihara,
Nishi, & Nobutomo claim (Table 5). Whether on the likelihood of recov-
ery or the amount of damages received, the differences among the various
courts are largely insignificant.
3.3.6. The published malpractice cases take longer to adjudicate than the unpublished
malpractice cases
74 The plaintiffs in the published cases litigate longer than those in the
unpublished cases. According to Table 1 Panel B, from 1998 to 2004,
filing-to-judgment times for malpractice cases as a whole fell from about
three years to two. During the same period, the filing-to-judgment times
among the published cases fell, but remained higher: from about 4.5
years to 3.5.
Table 5. Geographical Differences
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable Plaintiff Recovers Award Value File-to-Judgment
Tokyo .025 (0.13)  5.95 (0.94)  .811 (2.56)**
Osaka .479 (1.86)* 9.55 (1.35)  .110 (0.31)
Nagoya .208 (0.54)  12.1 (1.10) 1.340 (2.54)**
Yokohama  .078 (0.20) 3.96 (0.31)  .650 (1.18)
Kobe .288 (0.62)  .24 (0.02)  .060 (0.09)
Fukuoka Dropped  3.59 (0.33)  .267 (0.42)
Shizuoka  .736 (1.49)  5.98 (0.26) 2.281 (2.35)**
Male .089 (0.53) 14.6 (2.91)*** .179 (0.70)
Age .021 (1.84)* .15 (0.41)  .013 (0.76)
Age Sq  .003 (1.97)*  .007 (1.45)  .000 (0.04)
Death  .167 (0.96) 6.09 (1.20) .432 (1.62)
No Causation  30.1 (5.25)*** .574 (1.81)
Pltf Recovers  .049 (0.16)
Demand Value 5.58@ (2.42)**
n 299 241 239
Adj/pseudo R2 .04 .18 .12
Regression Probit OLS OLS
Notes: ***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. @ is 109. Coefficients in Column (2) are
divided by 106, and dataset in is limited to Pltf Recovers¼ 1. Published opinion dataset, as
described in text.
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75The longer times-to-judgment in the published opinion database may
reflect in part the slightly smaller fraction of Tokyo and Osaka cases (see
Subsection 3.3.5, above). For reasons discussed elsewhere (Ramseyer,
2010), Tokyo and Osaka courts handle malpractice cases quickly. The
phenomenon appears in Table 5 Column (3), where I regress time-to-
judgment on the geographical variables. Parties that litigate their malprac-
tice case in Tokyo can expect a decision nearly a year earlier than those who
litigate it in one of the courts not listed.
76The longer filing-to-judgment times among the published cases probably
also reflect the higher stakes involved. In my Table 5 regression, I regress
time-to-judgment on (inter alia) the amount the plaintiff demanded. The
resulting coefficient is both positive and statistically significant.
3.3.7. The published malpractice cases involve medical procedures similar to those
among malpractice cases generally
77Though not comprehensively, the administrative office does disclose
some information about the types of medical procedures that generate
the malpractice suits. Of the 2005 suits, for example, 39 percent involved
surgery. Fourteen percent involved obstetrics or gynecology (see Table 2
Panel A).
78The plaintiffs in the published opinions sued on a similar mix of suits.
Of these opinions, the plaintiffs in 46 percent sued on surgical procedures.
Fifteen percent sued on obstetrical or gynecological procedures.
3.3.8. Addendum: Comparison to settled cases
a. Yoshikawa. 79In 2006, prominent malpractice plaintiff’s attorney Koza-
buro Yoshikawa published a book detailing 45 malpractice cases he had
settled (Yoshikawa & Makabe, 2006). Over the course of his career
(1978–2005), he explained, he had fielded about 510 inquiries from clients
or potential clients. Of those, he had pursued about 100. The rest he had
concluded showed too low a probability of success. Of those 100þ cases,
he then detailed the major cases that resulted in a plaintiff recovery: 45
cases that settled, and 12 cases that went to a court decision.
80Given the obvious incentive facing Yoshikawa to exaggerate his career
success, these cases are decidedly non-random. That said, he reports:
 Of the 45 cases settled, 26 (58 percent) involved death claims
(published opinion database: 59 percent).
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 Fifty-three percent of the claimants were male, with a mean age
of 42 (published opinion database: 54 percent male, with a mean
age of 36).
 The plaintiffs in the wrongful-death cases received settlements
that ranged from 2 million yen to 80 million, with a mean of
29.7 million yen and a median of 30 million. Of the six cases
with sub-10-million-yen recoveries, three were cancer cases
(hence plaintiffs with a low life expectancy) and two involved
patients over age 70 (published opinion database: recoveries of
200,000 yen to 189 million, with a mean of 40.6 million yen
and a median of 37.5).27
 The nineteen claimants with non-death claims received settle-
ments that ranged from 5 million yen to 70 million, with a
mean of 40 million and median of 50 million (published opinion
database: 200,000 yen to 205 million, with a mean of 43.6 million
and a median of 20.7 million).
b.Tokyo District Court.81 Other evidence does indeed suggest that Yoshikawa’s
settled cases probably include unrepresentatively generous settlements.
The Tokyo District Court examined all cases in its malpractice panel
that settled during April 2001 to September 2002 (Tokyo chiho saibansho
iryo sosho taisaku iinkai, 2003: 35–36, 45). In Table 6, I compare these set-
tlements with the comparable statistics for the published opinion database.
82 Note two facts about these settlements. First, the plaintiffs settled for a
smaller fraction of the amounts they demanded than the litigating plain-
tiffs eventually obtained. Of the settling plaintiffs, 36 percent obtained at
least half of their demand. Of the published opinion plaintiffs, over 51 per-
cent did. This is of course exactly what one would expect if parties settled
for amounts that reflected a discount for their likelihood of recovery.
83 Second, the settling plaintiffs obtain relatively small amounts. Only 27
percent of the settling plaintiffs recovered 20 million yen. Of the published
opinion database, a full 58 percent did. This too is what one would expect
if settling plaintiffs discounted their expected recovery by the likelihood of
success—and is consistent with the general phenomenon of smaller-stake
disputes settling more readily than larger-stake disputes.
27 Given the high cancer mortality rates, Yoshikawa & Makabe (2006: 113) noted that recoveries
were low in cancer cases.
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4. LITIGATION
4.1. Introduction
84With this data, I explore several related questions: (1) Whom do Japanese
plaintiffs sue (Section 4.2)? (2) How much do they collect (Section 4.3)?
(3) Why do the patients sue the doctors that they do (Section 4.4)? (4)
Overall, how much claiming occurs (Section 5)? And (5) why are claiming
levels as low as they are (Section 6)?
4.2. Whom Do Patients Sue?
4.2.1. University professors, not private doctors
85Disproportionately, Japanese patients sue their university professors rather
than their clinic doctors.28 University hospitals contain 6 percent of all
beds; their physicians defend 18 percent of all malpractice suits. The
Table 6. Settlement and Litigation, by Award/Demand
Award/Demand
Settled
n (%)
Litigated
n (%)
less than 20% 11 (24.4%) 57 (21.7%)
20  < 30% 4 (8.9) 21 (8.0)
30  < 40% 9 (20) 25 (9.5)
40  < 50% 5 (11.1) 25 (9.5)
50% and over 16 (35.6) 135 (51.3)
Total 45 263
Over 20 million award: 12 (26.7%) 153 (58.2%)
Note: The table gives the number (and percentage) of cases that fell in a given range of the amount
of the award divided by the amount demanded by the plaintiff. The settled cases are all Tokyo Dis-
trict Court cases settled between April 2001 and September 2002, as investigated by the commit-
tee of the Tokyo District Court (as described in the text). The litigated cases are those in the
published-opinion database (as described in the text) that resulted in some recovery to the plaintiff.
28 Note that I cannot rule out the possibility that the clinics and hospitals use different settle-
ment practices. These data are consistent with a world where clinic doctors settle most of
the claims against them, while the universities refuse to settle and litigate instead.
As I explain much more fully in Section 4.4 below, it is perfectly logical that university hos-
pitals would be the primary target: they use large teams, take the sickest patients, use the most
sophisticated technology, and perform the most complicated procedures.
Note that the litigation and settlement of the claims against the clinic doctors would be con-
trolled by the casualty insurance firm underwriting the medical association’s liability policy;
the litigation and settlement of the claims against the (self-insured) university hospital would
be controlled by the senior officers of the university.
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small private clinics and hospitals supply 55 percent of all beds; their doc-
tors defend barely 41 percent of the suits (Table 2, Panel B). Were plaintiffs
suing over low-quality care, they would sue the doctors running the clinic-
mills. Instead, they sue the sophisticated specialists at the university hospi-
tals. Given that most clinic doctors buy the standard JMA malpractice
insurance, the plaintiffs are not suing the hospitals for the deep pocket.
Covered up to 100 million yen, the clinic doctors have pockets as deep
as the plaintiffs need.
86 In suing the university doctors, Japanese patients are not suing their
worst doctors. They are suing their best—albeit high-quality doctors
who may have made negligent mistakes. After all, as in the United States,
the physicians at the university hospitals represent the very brightest doc-
tors, the top of the medical quality distribution.
87 The doctors who staff the university hospitals attended the most com-
petitive universities. They performed at levels that earned them a position
on a university hospital staff. Despite the lack of financial incentives, they
trained for years in their specialty, and often in a subspecialty (sometimes
at U.S. hospitals). And the best of them provide care as sophisticated as
anything available anywhere in the world.
88 At the other extreme are the clinic doctors. Because of the national health
insurance payment schedule, a third of the doctors in Japan choose to operate
these rudimentary private clinics. They keep a few beds, and hire a nurse and
perhaps a pharmacist. They then run as many patients through the clinic as
they can. Paid by the visit, they make them return time and again. They keep
them hospitalized for long periods. They sell them large quantities of drugs.
89 These clinic doctors do not specialize. Instead, they hold themselves out
as both internists and surgeons, and treat whoever walks in the door. Many
of them inherited their clinics from their parents, and attended bottom-
tiered medical schools. Primarily because of the large tuition difference
(and with a few notable exceptions), most of the medical schools associ-
ated with the public universities are more selective than most of the private
medical schools.29 Yet while private schools graduate 39.5 percent of the
physicians each year, they educate most of the Tokyo clinic owners.30
29 See, e.g., http://daigaku.jyuken-goukaku.com/nyuushi-hensati-ranking/igakubu.
30 Take the Tokyo JMA members at the most active phase of their career—those born between
1955 and 1967. Of those operating private clinics, 72.5 percent attended a private school.
Database prepared for Ramseyer (2009a).
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4.2.2. Hospitals, not clinics
90To explore further the identity of the doctors whom patients sue, in Table 7
I regress the number of malpractice cases in a prefecture (published
opinions, 1995–2004) on several sets of prefecture-level independent var-
iables.31 In Column (1), I regress the number of suits on the number of
hospital beds and clinic beds. The message is simple: in a race between
the number of hospital beds and clinic beds, hospital beds win. The median
prefecture has about 24,000 hospital beds. A 10 percent increase would
raise the number of malpractice suits by about 1—a substantial increase
over the prefectural median of 2.5. The median prefecture has 2,900 clinic
beds. A 10 percent increase would decrease the number of suits by about
Table 7. Determinants of Malpractice Litigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suits
Population 22.2  3.68 4.37  5.59  10.6  22.4**
(1.14) (0.36) (0.41) (0.57) (0.53) (2.28)
Hospital beds .040* .043*** .017 .030** .028 .035***
(1.87) (3.89) (1.46) (2.67) (1.43) (3.70)
Clinic beds  .199*  .182***  .140**  .161***  .200**  .184
(1.88) (3.31) (2.46) (3.08) (2.10) (3.95)***
Medical school 7.585*** 3.671**
(10.29) (2.56)
Cardiac bypass 3.004*** 1.881***
(3.32) (4.17)
n: 46 45 46 45 46 45
Adj. R2 .66 .67 .90 .71 .73 .77
Regression: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Prefectures: All Ex Tokyo All Ex Tokyo All Ex Tokyo
Notes: ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic on the line below. Population co-
efficients are  107; bed coefficients are  102. All regressions include a constant term. All
prefectures except Okinawa.
31 Elsewhere, I add the number of attorneys to the regression. I omit Okinawa in these estimates
because of lingering differences in the structure of the legal services industry caused by the
long American occupation of the islands.
Fall 2010: Volume 2, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 651
 at Ernst M
ayr Library of the M
useum
 Com
p Zoology, H
arvard U
niversity on January 14, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
0.6. Sophisticated care generates more malpractice claims, simple care gen-
erates fewer: the greater the number of hospital beds in the prefecture, the
greater the number of malpractice suits; the greater the number of clinic
beds, the smaller the number of malpractice suits.32
4.2.3. Complex medicine, not simple
91 Similarly, in a horse race between complex care and simple, complexity
wins. In Column (3) of Table 7, I regress the number of suits on the number
of medical schools in the prefecture. Because the university hospitals special-
ize in the highest-risk patients, the most difficult diseases, and the most com-
plex, technology-intensive medical procedures, the number of university
hospitals proxies for the level of medical sophistication generally. Again,
the message is simple: the more medical schools in a prefecture (the higher
the level of medical sophistication), the more malpractice suits. The coeffi-
cient of 7.58 is enormous, but not implausibly so. Thirty-four prefectures
have 1 medical school (no prefectures have none); they have a median of
1 malpractice suit. The other 12 prefectures have a median of 11.5 suits.
The coefficient on the number of clinic beds remains significantly negative.
92 In Column (5), I regress the number of suits on the number of hospitals
in a prefecture doing more than 100 CABG operations. CABG operations
do not themselves generate more than a few malpractice claims. Because of
their difficulty, however, they proxy for the level of medical sophistication
in a community. The CABG operation is extraordinarily difficult, and pre-
fectures that do more of them will also do more sophisticated medicine
generally. Once again, the result is simple: the greater the number of hos-
pitals doing a substantial number of CABG operations (the higher the level
of medical sophistication), the greater the number of malpractice suits.
The coefficient of 3.00 is large, but plausible. The median prefecture has
two such hospitals. The 26 prefectures with two or fewer bypass hospitals
have a median of 1 malpractice suit. The other 20 prefectures have a
median of 8 suits. Again, the coefficient on the number of clinic beds
remains significantly negative.
93 Because plaintiffs file 30 percent of all malpractice suits in Tokyo, Tokyo
could, hypothetically, drive these results. It does not. In Columns (2), (4)
32 The result is not entirely robust. If I both add the number of attorneys as an independent
variable and exclude Tokyo, the coefficients on the two bed variables become insignificant.
See, e.g., Column (2), Table 10.
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and (6), I run the same regressions without Tokyo. The results remain
largely unchanged.
4.3. What Do They Collect?
4.3.1. $400,000 lives
94Among the plaintiffs in the published-opinion database, 74 percent recover
some amount. As noted earlier, the same is not true of most malpractice
plaintiffs. In 2004, plaintiffs filed 1,110 suits. They pursued 405 to judgment,
and in those 405 only 40 percent of the plaintiffs recovered anything (Table 1).
95Among the published-opinion plaintiffs who collected some amount,
recoveries ranged from 200,000 to 205 million yen, with a mean of 41.8
million and a median of 32.9 million—at the approximate exchange rate
of 100 yen per dollar, a mean of $420,000 and a median of $330,000. In
wrongful death cases, the awards ranged from 200,000 to 189 million
yen, with a mean of 40.6 million and a median of 37.5 million. As in the
United States, wrongful-death claims do not generate the highest recov-
eries. Instead, the long-term disability claims do.
96Table 8 Panel A gives the ten highest awards. Seven of the ten involve dis-
ability claims, and three involve wrongful death. The highest award was 205
million yen ($2.1 million), and the highest wrongful-death award was 189
million ($1.9 million).
4.3.2. Predictably valued lives
97In Table 5, I take those published opinions in wrongful-death cases that
yielded a plaintiff recovery and regress the award on the geographical var-
iables, the plaintiff’s sex, age, age-squared, whether the plaintiff died, and
whether the doctor caused the entire loss. The results indicate that male
losses average 15.4 million yen more than female losses. The Age and
Age Squared coefficients suggest that the value of life rises initially, and
then declines (compare Table 9 Panel B Column (3)).
98According to the opinions themselves, the judges calculate wrongful-death
awards by present-valuing a decedent’s expected earnings. They then subtract
about half for forgone maintenance, and add a standard amount for pain and
suffering. As Leflar (2009a: 445) and Feldman (2009: 265–66) rightly explain,
this is the formula judges developed to standardize damages in automobile
accident cases.
99The opinions confirm the judges’ descriptions of what they do. Largely,
they value a life by present-valuing the decedent’s lost earnings—hence the
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Table 8. Valuation of Human Life
A. High Awards
Date Court Award Sex Age Death Diability
Mar. 13, 2002 Tokyo 205 million Male 50 No Yes
Feb. 16, 2004 Chiba 189 million Male 14 Yes No
May 26, 2003 Tokyo 169 million Female 20 No Yes
Apr. 24, 1998 Osaka 153 million Male 63 Yes No
Nov. 21, 2002 Tokyo 153 million Male 30 No Yes
Jan. 21, 2004 Osaka 150 million Male 32 No Yes
July 29, 1999 Fukuoka 145 million Female 0 No Yes
Apr. 19 2001 Tokyo 141 million Male 4 No Yes
July 8, 1996 Kobe 138 million Male 62 Yes No
Mar. 31, 2003 Yamaguchi 137 million Male 29 No Yes
B. Human Life Valuation
Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated using.
Traffic Accid. Formula Observed Court Formula
Men Women Men Women
20 72,007 52,649 50,505 47,448
30 72,537 45,887 64,768 51,650
40 68,917 39,799 71,820 47,073
50 61,148 34,388 65,252 42,223
60 49,230 29,651 44,647 35,689
Notes: In 1000 yen. The ‘‘Traffic Accident Formula’’ is the value of human life calculated using
the standard formula, with 2.5 million yen for pain and suffering, 1.5 million for funeral
expenses, a living expense offset of 50 percent, the sex-specific average Japanese annual earn-
ings given at www.english-resume.net/indiv/ent41-02.php, and standard Japanese Leibnitz
discounting tables. The ‘‘Observed Court Formula’’ is the predicted amount using the coeffi-
cients calculated through an OLS regression of court awards on Age, Age Squared, and a con-
stant, as discussed in the text.
C. Court-Award/Plaintiff-Demand
Award Demand Fraction of All Cases
0–20% 4.6%
21–40 14.8
41–60 25.0
(continued)
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differences by sex and age. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 Panel B, I use
sex-specific average earnings figures to calculate the value of life for men
and women according to the ostensible judicial formula. The numbers
peak at about age 30 for men at 73 million yen, and at age 20 for
women at 53 million yen.
100To compare these formula-based figures with the actual results in the
published opinions, I separately regress the damages awarded on Age
and Age Squared for men and women. I then use the calculated coefficients
to estimate the point values for various ages.33 As a comparison of
Columns (1) and (2) with (3) and (4) shows, the values are close, generally
within 5–10 million yen of each other. The observed mean values in Table
4 Column (4) are lower only because the published opinions include a
large number of older victims (Table 2 Panel C).
101The similarity between the ostensible formula-based figures in Table 8
Columns (1) and (2) and the actual regression-based point estimates in
Columns (3) and (4) suggests two implications. First, these value-of-life
estimates are not an artifact of publication-bias. Hypothetically, the private
court reporters might have chosen to publish the opinions that awarded
unusually high amounts. Instead, the judges in the published opinions
awarded amounts that track the amounts predicted by the official formu-
lae. Courts invoke the formulae as the proper way to value human lives; the
regressions suggest they do what they say.34
Table 8. (Continued)
C. Court-Award/Plaintiff-Demand
Award Demand Fraction of All Cases
61–80 26.9
81–100 28.7
Mean Award/Demand¼63.5%
Notes: Civil cases only; wrongful death cases only. Excludes those in which the plaintiff did not
recover, or where court found comparative negligence or intervening causes.
Sources: Published opinion data base, as described in the text.
33 I limit the regressions to wrongful-death cases yielding a plaintiff recovery, but not raising
causation issues.
34 Note also that in Table 3 Col. (4), I report the mean amounts paid in all law suits (published
and unpublished), as reported in Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001). These numbers are
consistent with the mean amounts reported in the published opinions.
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102 Second, in 1989 Ramseyer & Nakazato argued that the routinized, highly
predictable traffic-accident damage formula facilitated settlement in Japa-
nese litigation. Maybe standardized judgments are routine in traffic acci-
dents, some critics replied, but automobile accidents are exceptional
(Foote, 1995; Riles & Uchida, 2009: 8). If traffic accidents are exceptional,
however, they are no more so than medical malpractice. There, judges use
exactly the formula they use in traffic accidents—with the result, as Leflar
(2009a: 445) put it, that once again the ‘‘predictability of damages aids pre-
trial settlement of cases.’’
4.3.3. Anticipated value lives
103 Because parties can use a decedent’s earnings to predict the judgment,
wrongful-death plaintiffs demand amounts that converge on the values
judges eventually award (see Table 8 Panel C). For the most part, in wrong-
ful death cases the judges value the decedents’ lives at about 64 percent of
what the plaintiffs initially demand. In five wrongful-death cases the judge
awarded the plaintiffs exactly what they demanded, and in about 30 per-
cent the judge gave the plaintiffs at least 80 percent. In only four cases
did the judge value the decedent’s life at less than a fifth of what the plain-
tiff demanded. Obviously, most plaintiffs are not ‘‘adding zeros’’ to their
claims.
4.3.4. Universities and clinics
104 Damages are especially high in cases against large university and govern-
ment hospitals. According to Panel A of Table 9, the university hospitals
paid a mean 63.7 million yen (about $640,000) per case and the govern-
ment hospitals paid 60.9 million. The private clinics paid only 34.7 million
yen ($350,000). To hold the basic patient-level variables constant, in Table
9 Panel B I regress the amount awarded on, inter alia, the health-care insti-
tution involved. Because the omitted variable is Clinic, the coefficient on
University Hospital indicates that courts award plaintiffs an additional
30 million yen in suits against a university hospital.
105 The high awards against university hospitals probably reflect the mix
of patients and medical procedures involved. Where the university hospi-
tals specialize in complex procedures involving critically ill patients, clinics
largely offer routine services for well patients. For the most part, the same
degree of negligence will generate greater damages at the former than
the latter.
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Table 9. Institutional Differences
A. Damage Awards
Mean Award n.
1. All Cases:
University hospital 63.7 million yen 33
Government hospital 60.9 33
Red Cross hospital 46.3 7
Other public hospital 50.7 17
Private hospital 50.1 52
Dental office 1.3 4
Clinic 34.7 38
2. Death Cases Only:
University hospital 59.7 million yen 19
Government hospital 49.0 16
Red Cross hospital 58.0 4
Other public hospital 47.7 13
Private hospital 52.5 36
Dental office 0
Clinic 41.4 15
Notes: Table includes only those cases where plaintiff receives some amount, and where court
does not dock amount for either comparative negligence or causation.
B. Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
Variable:
Plaintiff
Recovers
Award Value Award Value
File-to-
Judgment
University
Hosp
 .328 (1.24) 30.4 (3.94)*** 12.7 (1.47) .430 (1.03)
Government
Hosp
 .240 (0.92) 19.7 (2.65)*** 5.11 (0.61) .883 (2.14)**
Red Cross
Hosp
 .291 (0.71) 3.25 (0.25) 4.79 (0.32)  .266 (0.37)
Other Public
Hosp
 .260 (0.90) 15.2 (1.73)* 3.62 (0.41) .077 (0.17)
Private Hosp .085 (0.32) 1.38 (1.95)* 4.69 (0.60) .170 (0.43)
Dental Office  1.110 (1.20) 42.3 (1.15) Dropped  2.48 (1.26)
(continued)
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106 Yet even among wrongful-death claims, the courts award higher dam-
ages against university and government hospitals. According to Table 9
Panel A, in wrongful-death cases these hospitals paid 59.7 and 49.0 million
yen respectively. The clinics paid only 41.4 million yen.
107 The same phenomenon appears in the Panel B regressions. Suppose I
regress Award Value on the institutional variables, but limit the cases to
those involving wrongful-death claims. The coefficient on University Hos-
pital falls in magnitude and significance, but remains at 12.7 million yen.
Given that the wrongful-death award represents (both officially and actu-
ally) forgone future earnings, university hospitals apparently serve a
wealthier clientele than the clinics. Better educated patients tend to be
richer than average, and—whether in the United States or Japan—tend
to know when and how to obtain sophisticated care.35
Table 9. (Continued)
B. Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent
Variable:
Plaintiff
Recovers
Award Value Award Value
File-to-
Judgment
Male .070 (0.42) 12.4 (2.52)** 14.7 (2.81)*** .236 (0.90)
Age .024 (2.21)** .066 (0.19) .849 (2.31)**  .012 (0.65)
Age Sq
 .0003
(2.30)**
 .007 (1.56)  .014 (2.84)***  .0000 (0.18)
Death  .192 (1.12)  7.02 (1.43) .309 (1.13)
No Causation  29.3 (5.38)***  32.2 (5.61)*** .450 (1.39)
Pltf Recovers  .018 (0.06)
Demand Value 4.64@ (1.88)**
N 310 239 142 237
Adj/pseudo R2 .04 .24 .27 .007
Regression Probit OLS OLS OLS
Cases All Awards Death Awards
Notes: ***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Column (1) are divided by 106, and dataset
in (2) and (3) is limited to Pltf Recovers¼ 1. Column (2) includes all awards; Column (3) includes
only wrongful-death cases. Published opinion dataset, as described in text. @ is 109.
Sources: Published opinion data base, as described in the text.
35 Given that most medical schools are located in urban areas, one might have thought the sig-
nificant coefficient merely reflected the higher wages in the cities. According to unreported
regressions, however, the result is robust to the inclusion of geographical dummies.
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4.4. Why Do Patients Sue their Best Doctors?
4.4.1. Introduction
108Why would Japanese patients disproportionately sue their best doctors
rather than their worst? Why would they sue the specialists offering the
most sophisticated care rather than the desultory clinic doctors peddling
excessive antibiotics? I do not claim to offer a complete explanation.36
Paradoxically, however, patients sue the best doctors in part (a) precisely
because they offer the most sophisticated care (Subsection 4.4.2, below);
(b) because courts hold them to higher standards (Subsection 4.4.3);
and (c) because they keep careful records to facilitate the teamwork
involved (Subsection 4.4.4).
4.4.2. They perform the most sophisticated work
(a) Introduction. 109University hospitals specialize in the difficult, aggressive
treatment of high-risk patients. They take people no one else can cure,
and attempt complex, risky measures to save them. Among the obstetri-
cians, for instance, those on the university staff take the high risk pregnan-
cies; those in the private clinics take the ‘‘well babies.’’ Among patients
generally, the university hospitals take those needing the most aggres-
sive procedures; the private clinics take healthy patients who want basic
reassurance.
110As the mean 36-day hospital-stay figures for Japan suggest (compared to
6.5 days for the United States; Ramseyer, 2009b: 312), moreover, many
clinics (not university hospitals) function as long-term care facilities.
They do not perform one difficult procedure after another. They do not
rotate critically ill patients through their beds at American paces. They
take old, mentally ill, and moderately sick patients and house them for
weeks on end at government expense.
(b) More bad outcomes. 111That the university hospitals specialize in
sophisticated care for the highest-risk patients generates two closely related
consequences. First—the degree of negligence held constant—a higher
fraction of cases at the university hospitals will result in ‘‘bad outcomes.’’
Patients will not sue unless they experience an adverse event. Negligence or
no, absent that adverse outcome they have no damages to collect. Even
36 Some readers of earlier drafts argued, for example, that patients may sue clinic doctors less
often because they have closer, more personal ties with them. I have no evidence for or against
this claim.
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among entirely non-negligent doctors, in other words, the one who treats
the high-risk (i.e., sicker) patients will generate more bad outcomes than
the one who caters to healthy patients. The point follows from the very def-
inition of ‘‘high risk.’’
112 If patients could evaluate medical care accurately, they would not sue non-
negligent doctors who cause bad outcomes. But most patients cannot evaluate
care accurately. They lack both the information and the expertise necessary to
distinguish negligently-induced bad outcomes from simple bad luck. Lacking
that information and expertise, they make both Type I and Type II errors:
they forgive negligent doctors they should sue, and they sue non-negligent
doctors they should thank. Even among the non-negligent doctors, therefore,
patients will more often sue those offering sophisticated procedures to high-
risk patients than those offering routine care to the fundamentally healthy.
113 Another way to phrase the point is that the less sophisticated procedures
generate fewer bad outcomes that the patients can blame on their doctor.
Clinic patients will not experience fewer bad outcomes. To the extent mod-
ern medical care improves patient welfare, they will experience more. They
will, however, experience fewer they can blame on a doctor.
114 Suppose a patient has severe atherosclerosis. Suppose further that with-
out a by-pass operation he will probably die. Although the operation
increases the chance that he survives, it carries its own risks. It will not
even necessarily save him. In the end, the preceding decades of fatty
foods, indolence, and stressful work may kill him anyway.
115 Suppose the patient does not receive a by-pass, and dies. Not having had the
operation, his heirs cannot attribute the death to a doctor. But suppose instead
he has the by-pass. He may live—but only ‘‘may.’’ He still may die, and if he
does, his heirs can now plausibly blame his doctor for the death. By-pass oper-
ations may save lives, in other words, but because of the risks they inherently
present and the health of the patients who undergo them, they increase the
number of adverse events patients can try to blame on their doctors.
116 Patients will only sue a doctor when they experience a bad outcome that
they can attribute to a doctor or hospital. Through its pricing structure, the
Japanese insurance system discourages physicians and hospitals from
offering intrusive procedures to seriously ill, high-risk patients. Necessa-
rily, it reduces the number of adverse events for which patients can try
to hold doctors and hospitals responsible.
(c) More negligence.117 Second, physicians performing more complex pro-
cedures may cause more genuinely negligent injuries. In part, this is
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because the coordination necessary for teamwork itself adds an easily
identifiable potential error (Mello & Studdert, 2008). But Mark Grady
(1988) offered another reason not specific to Japan.37 Suppose a doctor
lets his mind wander for 30 seconds. If a clinic internist does so while see-
ing a local patient, he may miss some symptoms. If he catches his slip, he
will simply ask the questions again. If he misses his slip, he may misdiag-
nose the patient and prescribe the wrong antibiotic. But given that most
people recover from most illnesses anyway, the patient will probably
never notice.
118Similarly, suppose a clinic surgeon lets his mind wander while setting a
broken tibia. Usually, the bone will still heal. Sometimes, the surgeon may
have to re-set it, but most patients will never know why. And if the improp-
erly set bone does cause some residual pain, most patients will ‘‘live with it’’
rather than try to determine whether the doctor caused it negligently.
119Suppose, however, that a thoracic surgeon lets his mind wander in the
course of a CABG operation. Or suppose a neurosurgeon lets his mind
wander while cauterizing a blood vessel in a patient’s brain. Some patients
will find themselves disabled for life. Others will die. In effect, the techno-
logical sophistication of the procedure will transform the same routine
(and usually harmless) human fault, a wandering mind, into legal negli-
gence, and massively increase the costs to the patient.38
4.4.3. Courts hold them to higher standards
120Japanese courts hold sophisticated physicians and institutions to higher
levels of care than the levels they impose on the clinic doctors. The higher
the quality of the institution and the greater the expertise of the physician,
the higher the level of care the court will demand. And the higher the qual-
ity of care available in a community, the higher the standard to which
37 And explicated further in Grady (2009: 179, 213–218) (‘‘negligent accidents usually become
more common, not less, when safety technology becomes better’’). This and related themes
have been explored insightfully by several other scholars as well. See, e.g., Sage (2003); Jacob-
son (2006: 118) (‘‘precision of new technologies means that momentary lapses or minor mis-
takes can have serious consequences’’).
38 As Grady (2009: 218) put it: ‘‘Paradoxically, claims for negligent appendectomies will be
stronger in the twenty-first century than they were in the nineteenth century, even when
safety technology is better today and today’s overall safety investments are larger than
they were in the nineteenth century. The better safety technology itself causes increased
negligent behavior—not just increased findings of negligence, but increased rates of negli-
gence itself.’’
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courts will hold physicians in that community. As the Supreme Court put
it in 1995:39
When a new method of treatment has been developed, should it (the tests,
examination, treatment, etc.) be demanded of a medical institution? One
cannot make the decision without considering the character of the medical
institution, the medical environment of the area in which the institution is
located, and so forth. It is not appropriate to ignore these factors and
impose. a uniform medical standard on all medical institutions.
121 Civil-law scholar and then–University of Tokyo professor Takashi Uchida
(2007: 327) explains:
In the [1995 Supreme Court] case, a hospital providing a high level of care
was the defendant. Yet the diffusion of new treatment methods proceeds at
different speeds depending on ‘‘the character of the medical institution
[and] the medical environment of the area in which the institution is locat-
ed.’’ As a result, the presence of a violation of the duty of care should be
determined by taking all of the factors into consideration.
4.4.4. They produce more transparent records
122 Because the large hospitals offer their care through teams, they necessarily
need to keep fuller, more transparent records. They keep these documents
to facilitate the coordination necessary among specialists (coordination failures
are themselves a source of legal negligence), but the more transparent records
also enable plaintiffs after the fact to identify any mishaps. Because doctors in
clinics and small hospitals supply most of the care themselves, they have less
reason to keep transparent records. And if more transparent records facilitate
litigation, then all the more reason to keep any records cryptic.
123 Indeed, should a clinic doctor want to ‘‘scrub’’ a patient’s medical
records after the fact, sometimes no one will prevent him (or her) from
doing this either. One legal handbook for doctors makes the point explicit
(Inoue, 2007: 88). Suppose, it suggests, that you are asked to disclose:
39 Kono v. Nihon sekijuji sha, 1537 Hanrei jiho 3, 7 (Sup. Ct. June 9, 1995) (ital. added). That the
standard of care varies by institutional character and geography is not peculiar to the 1995
case. Other opinions making the same point include: Kono v. Iryo hojin Ijinkai, 1734 Hanrei
jiho 90, 100–01 (Nagoya D. Ct. Apr. 8, 1999) (finding liability); Yokozawa v. Japan, 1271 Han-
rei jiho 3, 427 (Tokyo High Ct. Mar. 11, 1988) (finding liability); Ikemoto v. Kitakyushu, 1265
Hanrei jiho 75, 76 (S. Ct. Jan. 19, 1988) (Ito, J., concurring) (no liability); Hiranuma v.
Tanaka, 1236 Hanrei jiho 105, 110 (Osaka D. Ct. June 12, 1986) (no liability).
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a complete set of the original medical records such as the patient’s medical
chart. When you receive that disclosure request, you should first check the
entire document. If you find a mistake, you should correct it. If you find mat-
ters only inadequately noted, you should add the necessary material.
124Legal? In a handbook for potential plaintiffs, one lawyer understandably
implies that it approaches fraud (Ueda, 2007: 117–125). He recognizes
that it commonly happens, however, and details ways to detect it.
125Reflecting a patient’s inability to learn of physician error in a small clinic,
the published-opinion database contains almost no successful claims against
a clinic—where the patient ended his medical care there. Instead, virtually
the only claims against the clinics that appear are those where the patient
began his (or her) care at the negligent clinic, but then moved to a second
institution. More precisely, in 43 of the 51 cases where a plaintiff recovered
damages from a clinic, the patient moved from the negligent clinic to a hos-
pital that could then testify to what initially happened in the clinic.
126The logic is simple. Suppose a clinic doctor botches an operation, and
realizes he (or she) cannot handle the situation. Reluctantly but conscien-
tiously, he (or she) calls an ambulance. The ambulance rushes the patient
to the municipal hospital, where the more sophisticated specialists do their
best to save him. If the patient dies anyway, his family may (no doubt
sometimes the hospital staff hesitate to ‘‘rat’’ on the clinic doctors) hear
all about the erring clinic doctor from the hospital staff.
127By contrast, suppose the clinic doctor botches an operation but does not
bother to call an ambulance. He (or she) knows he (or she) cannot handle
the situation, but would prefer no one else learn of his (or her) mistake.
Rather than rush the patient to the hospital, the doctor just lets the patient
die. The patient’s heirs will have far less access to any information they
would need to file a suit.
128In the Japanese court opinions, heirs sometimes sue the conscientious
doctor who calls the ambulance. The doctor who lets the patient die,
they virtually never do.
5. OVERALL CLAIMING LEVELS
5.1. Estimating from Insurance Premia
129Insurance premia offer one way to estimate the amounts that claimants
recover. Regulated, to be sure, the Japanese casualty insurance market is
Fall 2010: Volume 2, Number 2 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 663
 at Ernst M
ayr Library of the M
useum
 Com
p Zoology, H
arvard U
niversity on January 14, 2016
http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
competitive. And in competitive markets, insurers will set their premia at lev-
els that let them recover their expected liabilities and administrative costs.40
130 Doctors who operate private clinics can buy personal malpractice cov-
erage through the JMA for 70,000 yen.41 They can add institutional cover-
age through casualty insurance firms at rates estimated at 30,000 yen per
bed (Leflar, 2009b: 8 n.28). And staff doctors can purchase coverage at
rates advertised (in mid-2009) at 40,000 to 60,000 yen. Because Japanese
hospital physicians work as employees rather than (as often in the U.S.)
independent contractors, the hospital is liable for the doctor’s torts
under respondeat superior. As a result, the hospital’s resources are crucial.
131 Compared to liability premia in the U.S., these rates are low.42 U.S.
insurers charge prices that vary widely by specialty, but even in the cheap-
est fields they exceed these numbers. In internal medicine, U.S. insurers
charge $10,000–$20,000. In obstetrics and gynecology, they charge
$50,000–$90,000. Across all fields, they charge a mean of about $18,400
(2000 data; Sloan & Chepke, 2008: 59, 60 fig. 3.1).
132 From these revenues, insurers will expect to cover their liabilities and opera-
tional costs. By one insurance text, Japanese casualty insurers distribute about
55 percent of their premium revenue to claimants (Takimoto, 1994: 171).
According to its 2008 disclosure filings, Sonpo Japan (insurer to hospitals and
physicians) distributes about 60 percent of its revenues (Sonpo Japan, 2008).
133 If all doctors and hospitals bought insurance at these rates, malpractice
revenues would total:
Clinic doctors, at 70,000 yen: 4,958 million yen
Staff doctors, at 50,000 yen: 9,292 million
Beds, at 30,000 yen: 54,383 million
Total: 68,633 million yen
134 If insurers paid the full amount to claimants, they thus would pay 69 bil-
lion yen (about $690 million). If they paid only 55 percent, they would pay
40 Subject, of course, to qualifications relating to such factors as the insurance underwriting
cycle. For such reasons, the relation between premiums and payouts in the United States
has sometimes been hard to demonstrate.
41 About $700. See Leflar (2009a, 2009b). This contract pays up to 100 million yen, subject to a
1 million yen deductible.
42 They are also much more stable. Given the low claiming levels, Japanese premiums are not
subject to the fluctuations found in the United States.
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38 billion.43 Recall that Mello & Studdert (2006) estimate the total U.S.
(with 2.5 times the Japanese population) liability at $5.8 billion. Wheat
(2005) estimates the U.K. (with about half the Japanese population) liabil-
ity at $642 million. Apparently, Japanese claimants collect per capita about
16 to 29 percent as much as American claimants, and about 27 to 50 per-
cent as much as U.K. claimants.
135Only apparently—because this estimate is low. The calculation totals pre-
mium revenues—based on the prices charged clinics. But as the discussion
above shows, Japanese patients do not primarily sue the clinics. Dispropor-
tionately, they sue the large university and public hospitals. For the most
part, these institutions simply self-insure. If university doctors were to
buy third-party insurance on the market, they obviously would pay much
higher prices than those the JMA charges their compatriots in the clinics.
136For the same reason, the 30,000 yen per bed charge underestimates insti-
tutional liabilities. Clinics may pay 30,000 yen per bed, but patients do not
sue them. They do sue the university hospitals, and rational insurers would
never sell them coverage at 30,000 yen per bed. Rather than pay higher pri-
ces, the hospitals pay claims out of their operating budgets.
5.2. Estimating from Court Claims
137The published opinions offer an equally tentative way to estimate total
claiming levels. First, during the seven years from 1998 to 2004, plaintiffs
filed claims that yielded 229 published opinions (Table 1 Panel A). Among
these plaintiffs, those in 182 cases (using Table 1 Panel B and Table 4)
recovered 8.4 billion yen: a mean recovery of 36.5 million yen on all
cases, and 46.0 million yen per victorious case.44
138Second, during the same seven-year period, claimants litigated 2,298
(published and unpublished) malpractice cases to judgment. In these
cases, 931 plaintiffs recovered some amount:
Litigated to judgment: 2,298 cases over 7 years (328/year), with
plaintiffs recovering some amount in 931 cases (133/year).
43 Similarly aggregating physician and hospital premia, Kodama (2007: 74) estimates total mal-
practice payments in Japan at 50 billion yen.
44 Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo (2001: 58) and Hagihara, Nishi, & Nobutomo (2003: 121)
seem to report 22.0 million yen and 7.6 million yen, respectively, as the mean payouts for
1986–1998, despite purportedly using the same database.
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139 Additionally, claimants filed another 3,174 cases that did not proceed to
judgment.
140 By combining these observations, I can estimate an upper-bound to the
total recovery in litigated malpractice claims. Recall that the 182 successful
published-opinion plaintiffs recovered 8.4 billion yen. If the remaining
(931–182¼ ) 749 successful litigating plaintiffs recovered the same average
amount,45 they would have collected (749 46.0 million yen¼ ) 36.8 bil-
lion yen.
141 Turn then to the plaintiffs in the 3,174 cases from 1998 to 2004 who set-
tled or were dropped. Suppose that these plaintiffs succeeded at the same
rates as those who litigated to judgment (Table 1 Panel B).
Filed but settled: 3,174 cases over 7 years (453/year), with estimated
recoveries in 1,286 cases (184/year).
142 If the successful claimants collected the same average amounts as those
in the published-opinion cases, they would have recovered an additional
(1,286 46.0 million¼ ) 59.2 billion yen. Alternatively, suppose (as
seems more likely) that the settling claimants discounted their claims by
the expected probability of success. If so, then more of them would have
recovered something, but each would have received less. Given rational
expectations, defendants would have paid the same aggregate amount.46
143 By coupling the insurance-based estimates in Subsection 5.1 with these
court-claims-based estimates, I can also calculate the number of claimants
who settled without first filing suit. Over seven years, defendants paid to
the suing plaintiffs:
Actual amount to published-opinion plaintiffs: 8.4 billion yen
Estimated amount to unpublished opinion plaintiffs: 36.8 billion yen
Estimated amount to settling plaintiffs: 59.2 billion yen
Total: 104.4 billion yen
45 Table 1 Panel A indicates that these cases involved shorter times to judgment. In turn, this
suggests that the plaintiffs in the unpublished cases probably raised lower stakes and recovered
lesser amounts.
46 For example, suppose 100 claimants file suits for $5000, and each has a 20 percent chance of
success. If all parties settle at the expected value of their claim, the defendants will pay
$100,000: (.2 5000¼ ) $1000 to all 100 claimants. If instead all parties litigated to judgment,
the defendant would still pay $100,000: $5000 to (100 .2¼ ) 20 claimants.
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144Per year, defendants paid (104.4/7¼ ) 14.9 billion yen. The subsection 5.1
insurance-based estimates suggest a one-year total payout of 37.7 to 68.6
billion yen. Less the 14.9 billion to the filing plaintiffs, the defendants
must pay 22.8 to 53.7 billion yen per year to the non-filing (i.e., not filing
a claim in court) claimants.
145Furthermore, suppose defendants paid the non-filing claimants average
amounts equal to those they paid the published-opinion plaintiffs (36.5
million yen per plaintiff). Per year, they would have settled with
(22,800/37.7¼ ) 625 to (53,700/37.7¼ ) 1,471 non-filing claimants. If
they paid the non-filing claimants less (e.g., if, as seems reasonable, the
non-filing patients asserted smaller claims), they would have paid more
claimants.
146Based on Table 1 figures for 2004, these calculations yield a total collect-
ing (in- or out-of-court) claimant estimate of:
Litigating plaintiffs (405 .395): 160
Filed but settling plaintiffs (1,004 – 405): 599
Non-filing claimants: 1,471
Total claimants: 2,230
147Recall, however, that these estimates are low. The actually targeted
doctors almost surely pay more than the premia charged the JMA clinic
doctors.
148As an alternative approach, I can discount the litigated cases by more
general estimates of the number of out-of-court claims.47 Nakajima et al.
(2001: 1635), for example, suggest that Japanese claimants litigate 8 per-
cent of all malpractice claims; Sasao et al. (2006: 1953) puts the figure
at 10 percent. If plaintiffs annually file 1,110 claims in court, claimants
may assert (in and out of court) as many as 1,110/.08¼ 13,875 claims
per year.
149All told, the claim-based approach suggests a wide range: 1,004 liti-
gated claims per year, but between 2,230 and 13,875 total claims per
year. As two benchmarks, recall that Mello & Studdert (2006: 13) esti-
mate 50,000–60,000 paid claims a year in the United States. In Canada
47 Leflar & Iwata (2005) and Ramseyer & Nakazato (1999) also extrapolate from the number of
settlements negotiated through the prefectural medical associations. Unfortunately, this
introduces the same bias as the premium-based estimates. The prefectural medical associa-
tions only handle the claims against association members—overwhelmingly clinic doctors.
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(with one-third the Japanese population), claimants file 1,083 suits
(CHSRF, 2006).
6. WHY ARE CLAIMING LEVELS SO LOW?
6.1. Unfounded Explanations
6.1.1. Introduction
150 Apparently, claiming levels in Japan are not egregiously low, but they are
low nonetheless. To explain these claiming levels, observers to date have
advanced several explanations. Consider each in turn.
6.1.2. Attorney-driven explanations
(a) Fee structure.151 Several observers (e.g., Feldman, 2009: 264; Yasunaga,
2008; Leflar, 2009a; Maeda, Sakamoto, & Nobutomo, 2001) argue that
the traditional Japanese fee schedule discourages malpractice claims.
Under this schedule, clients initially pay their attorney a fraction of the
amount they demand as a nonrefundable retainer. Should they successfully
recover, they later pay him an additional fraction of the amount actually
collected. Many malpractice victims, these scholars explain, simply lack
the cash to advance their lawyer the initial payment.
152 As an explanation for the low claiming levels, however, this schedule-
based argument does not work. Crucially, these observers do not argue
that attorneys charge too much. Rather, they argue that attorneys structure
their fee according to a format that does not fit the market.
153 The explanation fails because the fee schedule has never been more than
a suggestion,48 and in some sectors (like the Tokyo international market) it
has been a routinely ignored suggestion. Had a different schedule with the
same expected value maximized the joint welfare of an attorney and poten-
tial client, they could and would have freely chosen it. And if a client with
a positive expected value claim needed a high-risk loan (the essence of a
contingent fee) that the attorney could not make, he could have borrowed
the money elsewhere and paid the attorney in cash.49
48 As some who posit this as an explanation acknowledge. See Feldman (2009: 264).
49 Whether the parties actually ignored the suggested fee structure is not the issue; the crucial
question is whether they could. If indeed they could ignore it but they did not, that fact simply
suggests that the structure suited the mutual interests of the attorney and client.
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(b) Number of Attorneys. 154For clients, the problem in Japan has not
involved (logically, could not have involved) the fee structure. Instead, it
has involved the fee level. Put most directly, attorneys have simply charged
more for their services than some malpractice claims warranted.
155Evidence that fee levels have priced some malpractice claimants out of
the market appears in Table 10. Attorney prices are a function (in part)
of supply: the number of attorneys per capita. In Column (1), I regress
malpractice suits per prefecture on the standard independent variables
and the number of attorneys in the prefecture. Because this number
is endogenous to the level of litigation, I instrument it by the level of ame-
nities available to professional families in the area. This is the approach
used in Nakazato, Ramseyer, & Rasmusen (2010) to instrument the num-
ber of attorneys in their study of prefecture-level attorney incomes. The
calculated coefficient on the number of attorneys is positive and signifi-
cant: the more attorneys per prefecture, the more malpractice suits.
156The result for attorneys is robust. Because half of Japanese attorneys
work in Tokyo (Nakazato, Ramseyer, & Rasmusen, 2010) and file the plu-
rality of all malpractice suits, Tokyo could be driving the results. In Col-
umn (2) I drop Tokyo, and the coefficient on attorneys remains strongly
significant, though the other coefficients lose significance. In Column
(3) I include the CABG variable, and in Column (4) I run the regression
in OLS. In both cases, the coefficient on the number of attorneys remains
positive and significant.
157This positive coefficient on the number of attorneys suggests that attor-
neys probably consider malpractice litigation undesirable work. Rational
attorneys will take first the projects paying the highest returns, and move
to lower-return projects only on a time-available basis. Infra-marginal, the
highest return projects will be insensitive to the number of attorneys; the
lowest return projects will not be, and according to Table 10 malpractice lit-
igation is not. Instead, the more attorneys in the area, the more malpractice
suits filed. Tentatively to be sure, the regressions suggest that attorneys take
malpractice cases only when they lack enough other work.
158Consistent with this observation, recall that plaintiffs disproportionately
file malpractice suits in Tokyo and Osaka (Table 1 Panel C). Because these
cities offer the greatest amenities for professional families, they attract the
most attorneys. And because of the resulting competition, the attorneys in
these prefectures (other than the few in the international law firms) earn
lower incomes than they could earn elsewhere (Nakazato, Ramseyer, &
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Rasmusen, 2010). Again, attorneys apparently turn to malpractice only
when clients offer insufficient better-paying work.
6.1.3. Cultural explanations
159 In a workshop on an earlier version of this paper, readers suggested that the
Japanese patterns of malpractice litigation might reflect distinctive aspects of
Japanese culture. Concerns over culture pervade comparative litigation
research—indeed, even domestically. De Ville (1998: 199) argues that:
Potential litigants are constrained by more than just legal rules. Cultural
and community attitudes, habits, and customs define socially accept-
able ways to deal with grievances. [W]hen people live in tightly knit,
kinship-based corporate communities, the social costs of disrupting the
order are greater and litigation is relied upon less frequently.
160 To test this and similar propositions, I offer several prefecture-level regres-
sions (Table 11). To capture the possibility that litigation might be a
‘‘non-traditional’’ strategy shunned by older members of the community,
in Column (1) I add the percentage of the population over age 64. The
Table 10. Malpractice Suits and Attorneys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Suits
Population  .000 (0.23) .000 (0.49)  .000 (1.74)* .000 (1.75)*
Hospital Beds .0002 (3.15)***  .000 (0.59) .0002 (3.09)*** .0002 (3.12)***
Clinic Beds
 .001
(2.56)**
.000 (0.57)  .001 (2.89)***  .001 (3.15)***
Cardiac
By-pass
1.018 (2.06)** .946 (2.84)***
Attorneys .008 (5.01)*** .022 (4.55)*** .008 (5.22)*** .008 (17.44)***
n 46 45 46 46
Adj R2 .96 .94 .97 .97
Regression 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Prefectures All Ex Tokyo All All
Notes: ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic on the line below. Population
coefficients are 107. All regressions include a constant term. All prefectures except Okinawa,
excluded because of its idiosyncratic legal market.
Attorneys are instrumented with variables indicating the amenities available to professional
families in the prefecture: Museums, Concerts, School Internet, and College Grads.
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coefficient is insignificant. To capture the possibility that farm communi-
ties might be more ‘‘traditional,’’ in Column (2) I add the percentage of the
economic output that is agricultural. Again, the coefficient is insignificant.
161De Ville (1998) suggests that litigation patterns will depend on whether
the community is tightly knit. Column (3) suggests mixed results: the
coefficient on the population itself is negative, but the coefficient on
the population density is positive. The former result is inconsistent with
Table 11. ‘‘Cultural’’ Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Suits
Population  .000  .000001  .000002  .000001  .000002
(1.23) (1.77)* (3.26)*** (1.76)* (2.93)***
Hospital Beds .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002 .0002
(3.01)*** (2.95)*** (3.78)*** (3.00)*** (3.80)***
Clinic Beds  .001  .001  .001  .001  .0003
(2.67)** (2.23)** (2.05)*** (2.99)*** (1.05)
Cardiac .946 1.077 .793 .939 .351
By-pass (1.80)* (2.12)** (2.14)** (2.52)** (1.06)
Attorneys .008 .007 .005 .009 .006
(4.35)*** (4.97)*** (2.88)*** (6.40)*** (4.72)***
% Over 64  .030 .129
(0.06) (0.48)
% Agricul Eco  .029  .015
(0.87) (0.51)
Density .006 .006
(2.64)** (4.12)***
GDP PC  1067 2607
(0.48) (1.34)
n 46 46 46 46 46
Adj R2 .97 .97 .97 .97 .98
Notes: ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic on the line below. All regres-
sions include a constant term. All prefectures except Okinawa, excluded because of its idiosyn-
cratic legal market.
Attorneys are instrumented with variables indicating the amenities available to professional
families in the prefecture: Museums, Concerts, School Internet, and College Grads.
Sources: Published opinion data base, as described in the text.
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the notion that more traditional communities forestall litigation; the latter
is consistent with it. The more people in a prefecture, the fewer suits filed,
but the more people per square kilometer, the more suits filed. To explore
the possibility that wealthier communities might be less traditional, in
Column (4) I add GDP per capita. The coefficient is insignificant. And
in Column (5) I add all four ‘‘cultural’’ variables: other than on Density,
the coefficients are again insignificant.
162 Perhaps the strongest evidence against the notion that cultural norms
seriously constrain malpractice claiming, however, lies in the very litiga-
tion one observes: Japanese claimants most readily sue university physi-
cians. Among all professionals in Japan, cultural norms assign no one
greater respect than the university professor. Whether on prestige, honor,
or moral authority, no other physicians approach the respect that Japanese
cultural norms grant university hospital physicians. If those norms protected
anyone, they would protect the professor. Yet patients do not sue the
more plebian, far-less-respected local clinic doctors. They sue their univer-
sity professors.
163 Advocates of a cultural approach could change the hypothesis, of course.
Perhaps cultural norms protect only local community members, not the
distant and unapproachable professor. Held to a higher standard, perhaps
the university professor faces stronger sanctions for any failings. Yet to sug-
gest such changes is to highlight the essentially non-testable nature of this
approach. Given the data, one can always tell a culture-based story that
‘‘explains’’ it. But as Talcott Parsons pointed out, the approach is as circu-
lar as they come (Geertz, 1973: 249–250): To explain the way people
behave as a product of their culture, while defining culture as the way
they have learned to behave does not, he is said to have told generations
of students. get us very far.
6.1.4. Court structure
(a) Delays.164 Scholars (Yasunaga, 2008; Feldman, 2009: 269; Maeda,
Sakamoto, & Nobutomo, 2001) also attribute the scarcity of malpractice
claims in Japan to the length of the court proceedings.50 Malpractice
50 Leflar (2009a: 444–445) rightly notes that delays in Japan were substantial only before the
recent reforms. In attributing the low claiming levels to delays, however, other observers
draw on a tradition in American scholarship that blames low Japanese litigation rates in
part on court delays (Haley, 1978). As the discussion here shows, Japanese courts are not par-
ticularly slow. See also Ramseyer & Nakazato (1999: 140–141).
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cases do take time. Where Japanese civil suits take a mean 8.4 months from
filing to judgment (Inoue, 2007 35), malpractice suits take 2.3 years. In
Table 12 Panel A, I compare the published-opinion malpractice cases
against a random sample of 120 published-opinion civil damage suits
from 1995 to 2004, with equal numbers of cases per year (generally one
per month). Where the random civil case takes 2.3 years, the malpractice
suit takes 4.3 years. When I regress filing-to-judgment on the usual inde-
pendent variables with the pooled malpractice-civil-damage dataset, the
coefficient on the malpractice dummy is positive and statistically signifi-
cant (Table 12 Panel B). Consistent with the two-year difference in
means (Panel A), the coefficient on the malpractice dummy is about 2.
165Malpractice claims take longer even with the amount at stake held con-
stant. According to Panel A of Table 12, malpractice plaintiffs demanded
an average 59 million yen. Plaintiffs in civil damage suits claimed only
31 million yen. And higher-stakes suits do take longer: the coefficient on
Demand Value in the pooled dataset regression is positive and significant
(Table 12 Panel B). With Demand Value held constant, however, the coef-
ficient on the malpractice dataset variable remains significant.
166Even if court delays explain part of the reason Japanese less readily
file claims over malpractice than over traffic accidents (if indeed they
do; I take no position on the question), they hardly explain why Japanese
file fewer malpractice claims than Americans. According to the NPPB,
incident-to-judgment times in the U.S. average 4.7 years. The Japanese
courts disclose only filing-to-judgment times, but in Japanese malpractice
cases these average 2.3 years.51 In the published-opinion database, the dif-
ference between incident- and filing-to-judgment times averaged 1.6 years.
If I add the 1.6-year difference to the mean filing-to-judgment times of 2.3
years, I still obtain average incident-to-judgment times in Japan of only 3.9
years. Malpractice litigation may take time in Japan, in short, but it is still
faster than in the United States.
(b) Burden of proof. 167Feldman (2009: 263–264) also blames the apparent
reluctance of Japanese patients to sue on the way courts require them
to bear the burden of proof: Japanese courts require them to ‘‘prove the
central elements of their allegations.’’ At a couple of levels, this fundamen-
tally misleads. First, that the Japanese courts require plaintiffs to prove
51 I exclude claims filed more than three years after the incident. These are primarily disability
claims filed after the patient was certified by the government as disabled.
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Table 12. Court Delays
A. Summary Statistics
Dataset n Min Median Mean Max
1. Filing to Judgment (years):
Malpractice cases 343 0 4 4.29 11
Random civil cases 120 0 2 2.34 11
2. Amount Demanded (million yen):
Malpractice cases 338 .589 59.4 74.4 546
Random civil cases 120 .388 31.4 71.3 674
B. Regressions
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: File-to-Judgment
Med Mal 1.970 (9.46)*** 1.891 (4.80)***
Demand Value:# 5.72 (5.14)*** 5.50 (4.90)***
Tokyo  .867 (3.77)***  .681 (1.45)
Osaka  .363 (1.34)  .512 (0.96)
Nagoya .568 (1.36)  .738 (0.97)
Yokohama  .649 (1.35)  .227 (0.12)
Kobe .925 (2.19)** .694 (1.12)
Fukuoka  .274 (0.60)  .165 (0.18)
Shizuoka 1.661 (2.65)*** 2.948 (1.51)
MM * Tokyo  .267 (0.50)
MM * Osaka .194 (0.31)
MM * Nagoya 1.903 (2.09)**
MM * Yokohama  .435 (0.22)
MM * Kobe .455 (0.52)
MM * Fukuoka  .145 (0.14)
MM * Shizuoka  1.422 (0.69)
Post 2001
MM * Post 01
n 456 456
Adj R2 .25 .25
Notes: ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels.
Coefficients, followed by the absolute value of the t-statistic on the line below. All regressions
include a constant term. #: 109. ‘‘MM *’’ designates the interaction of the variable with a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the case is from the medical malpractice dataset.
Sources: Published opinion data base, as described in the text.
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their case distinguishes malpractice claims neither from other Japanese
civil cases, nor from malpractice claims in the United States. In most
civil litigation in Japan, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. In most civil
litigation in the United States, including medical malpractice litigation,
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. That Japanese plaintiffs also bear the
burden in malpractice cases explains nothing.
168Second, just as American courts sometimes switch the burden of proof
to defendants through doctrines like res ipsa loquitur, so do Japanese
courts. As one court explained:52
The plaintiffs have neither asserted nor proven that the surgeon violated his duty
of care. Yet the case involves the highly specialized field of medicine. In such
cases, a plaintiff must show (i) that there was a mishap in his procedure, and (ii)
that his symptoms thereafter worsened. Once he does so, a court may properly
infer both negligence and the resulting injury.
169In some ways, Japanese plaintiffs in malpractice cases bear a lower burden
of proof than in other civil claims.
(c) Levels of damages. 170Some scholars further attribute the low malpractice
claiming levels to the more ‘‘modest’’ (relative to the United States) damages
awarded in Japanese courts.53 According to the published-opinion database,
however, Japanese courts award almost exactly the same average damages as
American courts. As Leflar & Iwata (2005) rightly observe, ‘‘mean and
median awards in U.S. wrongful death cases. seem not to diverge radically
from the Japanese scale of damages.’’ In wrongful-death claims, American
courts award a decedent’s heirs about $200,000–$300,000 (Section 1.1,
above). Where causation is not an issue, Japanese courts award victorious
plaintiffs in medical malpractice wrongful death cases a mean of about 50
52 Yamamoto v. Isami kotsu K.K., 485 Hanrei jiho 21, 25–26 (Tokyo D. Ct. June 7, 1967). In con-
testing this observation, Feldman (2009: 263) writes that the ‘‘Japanese academic commentary
on the burden of proof in malpractice claims uniformly asserts’’ that ‘‘the burden of proof falls
on plaintiffs.’’ In fact, commentators routinely discuss the way Japanese courts shift burdens
of proof to defendants in malpractice cases. Consider, for example, the standard civil law trea-
tise by then–University of Tokyo Professor Takashi Uchida (2007: 328): in medical malprac-
tice cases, courts sometimes ‘‘lighten the burden of proof through a method known as the
presumption of negligence.’’ He then elaborates on the point for over four pages. For other
discussions of the issue, see, e.g., Azami & Nakai (1994: 178–182), Kato (2005: 271–273),
Nakamura (2001: 279–280).
53 Feldman (2009: 266–267). In making this claim, Feldman again reflects one tradition in U.S.
scholarship. See note 50, above. This tradition identifies low court awards as one reason for
low litigation levels generally. See, e.g., Haley (1978).
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million yen (Table 4)—at 100 yen per dollar, about $500,000; including
cases of less than full causation, they award about 40 million yen.54 What-
ever the reason for the lower malpractice claiming levels in Japan, it is not
modest damages.
6.2. Alternative Hypotheses
6.2.1. Introduction
171 Patients file relatively few malpractice claims in Japan (not extremely few, but
fewer than in the United States and some other wealthy democracies), and
this study suggests (even if it does not prove) a reason why. I do not explore
the question directly. I do not collect data on all medical procedures. I do not
measure the quality of those procedures, and then compare the percentage of
problematic Japanese procedures with the percentage in other countries. I do
not ask why patients filed claims after some problematic procedures but not
others, and compare those reasons across different countries.55
172 Suggestively to be sure, however, the study does pose implications for
the level of malpractice claims. Those implications tie malpractice claims
to the level of medical technology, and medical technology levels to the
universal insurance program. The study clarifies which procedures most
often generate malpractice claims; other data identify the rates at which
Japanese physicians perform those procedures; and the insurance price
schedule identifies the economic reason why they perform them at the
rates that they do.
6.2.2. Skewed pricing
173 Consider these implications more closely. The Japanese government sup-
presses the price physicians can charge for various procedures. Crucially,
it does not suppress prices uniformly. Instead, it suppresses them by a
schedule biased against the technologically most sophisticated modern
procedures. For most work, it pays a lower price than doctors charge in
(for example) the United States. But for the most technologically demand-
ing procedures, it pays an especially low price.
54 This is subject to the qualification that claimants will (precisely because of the national health
insurance system) have lower claims for medical care. Wrongful death awards seem at least as
high in Japan as in the United States. Damages for patients who do not die, however, will
cover both medical care and lost wages. Given the insurance system, the former should be
lower in Japan than in the United States.
55 I also do not purport to explain the change over time shown in Table 1 Panel A.
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6.2.3. Rudimentary medicine
174Faced with relatively lower prices for sophisticated care than for routine
care, Japanese physicians focus on routine care. Compared to their peers
in the United States, they perform fewer of the complex procedures at
the heart of modern medicine. They perform fewer, whether compared
per capita or compared per disease-incidence.
175If they wished, the large Japanese hospitals and university medical
schools could perform the procedures. Technologically, they have (or could
obtain) the modern equipment necessary. Professionally, they have (or
could train) staff as sophisticated as those in any wealthy country. Yet com-
pared to hospitals and physicians in the United States, they rarely perform
the procedures. No matter how measured, they perform far fewer of the
most complex and sophisticated procedures.
176Faced with the insurance price schedule, nearly a third of Japanese phy-
sicians instead build (or inherit) and operate their own simple, private
clinics. They do not (with some exceptions) buy expensive specialized
medical equipment. They do not spend years in subspecialty residencies.
In fact, they hardly specialize at all.
177Yet of Japanese medical services, the clinic doctors supply a large frac-
tion. They treat nearly any patient who walks in the door. Paid for out-
patients by the visit, they require their patients to return time and again.
Paid generously for in-patient care, they warehouse their patients for
weeks on end at government expense.
6.2.4. Implications for claiming behavior
178Just as the insurance pricing schedule affects the levels of medical technol-
ogy, those technological levels in turn affect the rates at which patients file
claims. As explained above, the schedule increases the amount of rudimen-
tary care and decreases the amount of sophisticated care. The relative
amounts of the two levels of care, however, necessarily also affect the num-
ber of claims patients can plausibly file.
179For reasons elaborated in detail above at Section 4.4 (reasons, for the
most part, not specific to Japan), the structure of the insurance focuses
medical care on those procedures least likely to generate malpractice
claims. As the regressions show, patients are less likely to sue the local doc-
tors supplying the rudimentary, low-tech care. Instead, they sue the sophis-
ticated specialists offering the most complex and invasive medical care.
The Japanese national insurance reduces the quantity of sophisticated,
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complex care supplied. And in the process, it necessarily reduces the
amount of malpractice litigation brought.
6.3. Qualifications
180 It is easy to overclaim. Insurance-driven technology-suppression may
reduce the number of malpractice claims in Japan, but it hardly explains
the entire contrast with the United States. The frequency of doctor error
in the United States (relative to the frequency in Japan), for example, obvi-
ously matters too. To be sure, I have no reason to think American doctors
make more mistakes than Japanese doctors—but I have no data on point.
I have no reason to think American doctors more forthrightly disclose
their mistakes—but I have no data on that either.
181 Even more relevant, in several ways the U.S. judicial system may (the
subject is obviously beyond the scope of this study) encourage patients
to file meritless but extortionate claims in the name of malpractice.
According to some (not all) accounts, in using civil juries U.S. courts argu-
ably assign questions of care, causation, and damages to mistake-prone
novices. Many U.S. state courts use judges who are less qualified than in
Japan (on Japanese judges, see Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 2003), and accord-
ing to some accounts may bring a bias in favor of the local bar. And again
according to some accounts, discovery (unavailable in Japan) further
expands the scope for extortionate claims.
182 To date, however, scholars of Japanese of malpractice litigation have
focused on the perceived faults in the Japanese judicial system. In doing
so, they focus on the wrong questions, for their inquiries have been almost
entirely off-base. The attorney fee schedule in Japan, for instance, does
not explain the level of claiming—because the schedule does not bind.
Court delays do not explain it either—because Japanese courts are fast.
Low damage awards do not explain it—because Japanese courts are gener-
ous. Cultural peculiarities of Japanese society do not explain it—because
patients most often sue the very doctors they most respect. And burdens
of proof do not explain it—because Japanese courts impose the same
burdens as American courts.
7. CONCLUSIONS
183 Japanese patients seldom file malpractice claims. They do not claim as sel-
dom as sometimes thought, but they claim less than patients in the United
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States and some other wealthy democracies. To date, most scholars have
tried to explain the contrasts by identifying ‘‘faults’’ in the Japanese judicial
system.
184These scholars look in the wrong place. Part of the reason for the low
claiming levels probably (the result is only suggestive) lies instead with
the universal national health insurance program. Through the program,
the Japanese government provides heavily subsidized medical care to all
residents. To contain the enormous costs that such a demand subsidy
would otherwise entail, it suppresses the prices it pays for most procedures.
Crucially, it does not suppress prices uniformly. Instead, it suppresses most
drastically the technologically most complex procedures.
185These sophisticated procedures, however, are the very procedures most
likely (in any wealthy economy) to generate malpractice claims. Physicians
perform them in teams—increasing the transparency of the records avail-
able to the patients (or their heirs). Japanese courts hold the doctors able to
perform these procedures to higher standards of care—making it easier for
patients to meet their burdens of proof. The procedures are intrusive, suc-
ceed less often than ordinary medical care, and cater to higher-risk
patients—resulting in more adverse events. And some of the procedures
seem to demand greater attention and effort—perhaps generating more
cases of actionable negligence.
186Part of the reason for the lower level of malpractice claims in Japan, in
short, may lie in the very level of medical technology. To restrain the cost
of its universal insurance, the Japanese government has lowered the tech-
nological level of medical services its doctors provide. In the process, it has
cut the number of procedures most likely (for whatever reason) to generate
malpractice claims. That patients file so many claims in the United States,
as William Sage (2003: 3) put it, ‘‘is largely a product of modern medicine’s
tremendous success in treating disease.’’ That they file so many fewer in
Japan may be, in part, a product of the way the national insurance has pre-
vented as many people from enjoying that modern success.
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